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A LINGUISTIC JUSTIFICATION FOR
PROTECTING “GENERIC” TRADEMARKS
Jake Linford
17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 110 (2015)
ABSTRACT
A trademark is created when a new meaning is added to an
existing word or when a new word is invented in order to
identify the source of a product. This Article contends that
trademark law fails in critical ways to reflect our knowledge of
how words gain or lose meaning over time and how new
meanings become part of the public lexicon, a phenomenon
commonly referred to as semantic shift. Although trademark
law traditionally turns on protecting consumers from confusing
ambiguity, some of its doctrines ignore consumer perception in
whole or in part. In particular, the doctrine of trademark
incapacity—also known as the de facto secondary meaning
doctrine—denies trademark protection to a term that was once a
generic product designation, even if consumers now see the term
primarily as a source-signifying trademark.
Analyzing trademark acquisition through the lens of
semantic shift sheds light on how the trademark incapacity
doctrine misunderstands both the nature of language and the
role of consumer perception in shaping trademark’s competition
policy. Courts and scholars suggest that a generic term will
rarely acquire source significance, and that even if it does, there
are competitive, conceptual, and administrative grounds for
denying trademark protection. The standard account is
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mistaken: restriction of meaning—of which the change from a
generic product designation to a source signifier is one
example—happens frequently across time and across languages.
In addition, understanding how and why restriction occurs
highlights flaws in common justifications for trademark
incapacity. This Article proposes replacing the doctrine of
trademark incapacity with the primary significance test already
applied at other stages of trademark litigation. If there is
evidence that a majority of consumers have come to see the term
as source-signifying rather than product designating, the law
should recognize that source significance and the term should
qualify for federal trademark protection.
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INTRODUCTION
A term that designates a singular source for goods and
services, rather than the goods or services themselves, qualifies
for protection as a trademark. Trademark law thus turns in
large part on when a word or symbol acquires and loses sourcesignifying meaning in the eyes of consumers. While
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linguistics—the study of symbols and their meanings—has
made limited inroads in the analysis of trademark law and
policy,1 the existing scholarship has yet to mine a cornerstone
concept in linguistics: semantic shift.2 The study of semantic
shift in historical and cognitive semantic literatures is the
study of how a given word changes over time—first by entering
the public lexicon, and then by gaining or losing meanings.3
These new words and meanings enter the lexicon as speakers
search for new ways to express themselves. As Stephen
Ullmann recognized half a century ago, “The need to find a new

1

2

3

See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, What Linguistics Can Do for Trademark
Law, in TRADE MARKS AND BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 140,
157 (Lionel Bently et al. eds., 2008) (arguing that while trademark law
should not become beholden to linguistics, linguistic principles are
embedded in trademark law, and linguistic theory can provide a means for
uncovering “the inevitable prescriptive content of supposedly descriptive
assessments of trademark claims”); Alan Durant, How Can I Tell the
Trade Mark on a Piece of Gingerbread from All the Other Marks on It?
Naming and Meaning in Verbal Trade Mark Signs, in TRADE MARKS AND
BRANDS: AN INTERDISCIPLINARY CRITIQUE 107, 132 (Lionel Bently et al.
eds., 2008) (suggesting that pragmatics and discourse analysis, the
branches of linguistics that investigate language in use, are most likely to
contribute to our understanding of the important issues in trademark
law); Barton Beebe, The Semiotic Analysis of Trademark Law, 51 UCLA
L. REV. 621, 624 (2004) [hereinafter Beebe, Semiotic] (applying a branch of
linguistics, semiotics, or the study of signs, to trademark law and arguing
that the “grammar [of trademark law] must be understood not simply in
economic, but also in linguistic terms”); Laura A. Heymann, The
Grammar of Trademarks, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1313, 1320-21 (2010)
(arguing that incorporating linguistic theory on language formation can
help trademark law better reflect consumers’ perceptions of language);
Thomas R. Lee, Eric D. DeRosia & Glenn L. Christensen, An Empirical
and Consumer Psychology Analysis of Trademark Distinctiveness, 41 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1033, 1068-69 (2009) (applying psychological and brand
perception literature to challenge Beebe’s semiotic analysis); Regan
Smith, Note, Trademark Law and Free Speech: Protection for Scandalous
and Disparaging Marks, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 451, 452 (2007)
(applying semiotic theory to argue for reforming the scandalous marks
prohibition in trademark law); Timothy Greene, Trademark Hybridity
and Brand Protection, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 75 (2014) (analyzing trademark
dilution and genericness in light of psycholinguistics literature on
semantic ambiguity resolution).
Other scholars refer to these phenomena as semantic change, semantic
progression or semantic drift. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CLOSS TRAUGOTT &
RICHARD B. DASHER, REGULARITY IN SEMANTIC CHANGE 1 (2002) (defining
semantic change as a shift “from one linguistically coded meaning to
another”).
STEPHEN ULLMANN, SEMANTICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF
MEANING 209-10 (1962) (“Whenever a new name is required to denote a
new object or idea, we can do one of three things: form a new word from
existing elements; borrow a term from a foreign language or some other
source; lastly, alter the meaning of an old word.”).
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name is . . . an extremely important cause of semantic
changes.”4
Simply put, semantic shift is change in the meaning of a
word. The process of creating trademark meaning shares many
characteristics with other types of semantic shift. A trademark
is a word, phrase, or symbol that identifies goods or services
from a particular source.5 When a word or symbol gains sourcesignifying meaning, it qualifies for protection as a trademark.
Like other forms of semantic shift, investing a trademark with
meaning adds a new entry to the commercial lexicon. For
example, the Beatles plucked APPLE from among many preexisting options as a trademark for their record label, while
Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak picked APPLE as a trademark
for personal computers. At other times, a trademark is an
entirely new entry into the lexicon. For instance, the word
XEROX did not exist before it was coined as a designation for
photocopiers. In both cases, language changes to accommodate
new terms or new meanings for existing terms.
As a doctrinal matter, whether a given word obtains
protection as a trademark turns in part on the relationship
between the claimed mark and the word or words from which it
is derived. That relationship is mapped out along a spectrum of
inherent strength, most famously articulated in Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.6 The court in Abercrombie
established that the strength of a mark’s claim to trademark
protection depends on the likelihood that consumers will be
able to invest the mark with source-signifying meaning, based
on the distance between the mark chosen and the good it
signifies. While scholars have criticized the Abercrombie
spectrum as inaccurate or an unwelcome distraction from more
crucial inquiries,7 these categories generally reflect regular
forms of semantic shift.8
However, the synchronicity between theories of semantic
shift and the legal reality of trademark acquisition breaks
down when we reach the treatment of “generic” trademarks—

4
5

6
7

8

Id. at 210.
This article is limited to trademarks comprised of words and does not
address whether these principles could also apply to trade dress or design
marks.
537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
For a summary of these arguments, see Jake Linford, The False
Dichotomy Between Suggestive and Descriptive and Suggestive
Trademarks, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2015), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2585114, [hereinafter Linford, False
Dichotomy].
See infra Part II.A.
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words that identify, or have identified, a good or service—but
subsequently acquire source-signifying meaning. Under the
doctrine of “trademark incapacity,”9 courts dismiss evidence
that consumers perceive a term as source-signifying, cabining
the evidence as an indication merely of de facto—i.e., legally
insignificant—secondary meaning.10
For example, Microsoft Corporation sued Lindows.com, Inc.
for trademark infringement, alleging that Lindows.com’s use of
LINDOWS as a mark for a computer operating system
infringed Microsoft’s prior rights in WINDOWS as a mark for
its operating system.11 In response, Lindows.com challenged
the WINDOWS mark on genericness grounds.12 When
Microsoft adopted the WINDOWS mark in 1985, computer
programmers and competitors were using “windows” as a noun
to designate a graphical user interface (“GUI”) or its windowing
capability.13 Microsoft argued that the WINDOWS mark was
no longer generic because the primary meaning of “windows” in
the computing context had changed from designating GUIs to
signifying Microsoft’s WINDOWS operating system. Microsoft
provided consumer surveys in which “67% of the relevant
consumer population identified ‘Windows’ as the ‘brand name
of a product put out by one company.’”14 But despite this
evidence, the district court refused to give an instruction that
would have allowed the jury to consider the change in
trademark meaning.15
9

10

11

12
13

14
15

Louis Altman coined the phrase “trademark incapacity.” 3 LOUIS ALTMAN
& MALLA POLLACK, CALLMANN ON UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND
MONOPOLIES § 20:33 (4th ed. 1983); see also id. §§ 18:17 n.56, 18:20 n.3,
23:37 n.47, 40:57. This process goes by other names, including the betterknown but unwieldy “de facto secondary meaning doctrine.” This article
primarily uses the term trademark incapacity.
Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 9 (describing a generic term as “one that refers,
or has come to be understood as referring, to the genus of which the
particular product is a species” and holding that proof of source
significance in the eyes of consumers, “by virtue of which some ‘merely
descriptive’ marks may be registered, cannot transform a generic term
into a subject for trademark”).
Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com, Inc., 64 U.S.P.Q.2d 1397, 1398, 1400
(W.D. Wash. 2002) [hereinafter Lindows I]
Id. at 1404-07.
Id. at 1400; Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows.com Inc., 66 U.S.P.Q.2d 1371,
1373-74 (W.D. Wash. 2002) [Lindows II].
Lindows I, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1407-1410.
Microsoft Corp. v. Lindows Com, Inc., 69 U.S.P.Q.2d 1863, 1864 (W.D.
Wash. 2004) (refusing to instruct the jury that “the [WINDOWS]
trademark would [ ] be valid today so long as the primary significance of
the term today is not generic.”) [Lindows III]. The court of appeals refused
to hear an interlocutory appeal on the issue. Microsoft Corp. v.
Lindows.com, Inc., No. 04-80024, 2004 WL 1208044 (9th Cir. May 19,
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As a matter of black letter law, the court in Lindows.com
properly rejected Microsoft’s requested jury instruction because
under the doctrine of trademark incapacity, if the term chosen
was once generic, any subsequent addition of trademark
meaning is irrelevant. But the doctrine of trademark incapacity
is inconsistent with one of the most standard types of semantic
shift: restriction. When a word is restricted, it undergoes a shift
in meaning from a broad designator for all members within a
category to a prototypical member of the category.16 For
example, in Old English, hound or hund once meant any kind
of dog, but the meaning was restricted over time to long-eared
hunting dogs.17 A generic term that acquires source
significance is another manifestation of restriction in meaning.
For instance, in the 1800s, kiss once identified any small
sweetmeat or piece of confection,18 but kiss or kisses now brings
to mind a particular type of candy—the teardrop-shaped
chocolates offered for sale by the Hershey Company.19 While
restriction happens frequently, the doctrine of trademark
incapacity requires courts to ignore evidence that so-called
generic terms have acquired source significance in the minds of
consumers.
More broadly, the doctrine of trademark incapacity is also
incongruous with trademark law’s ostensible focus on
acknowledging consumer perception and protecting consumers
from confusion. Trademark protection is typically justified on
the ground that consumers use the trademark to distinguish
between the goods and services of different vendors.20 Thus,
trademark law looks to the consumer as the target audience by
which protection and infringement should be measured.
Trademark incapacity turns away from evidence about

16

17

18

19
20

2004) [Lindows IV]. Microsoft subsequently bought the LINDOWS mark
for $20 million. Kim Peterson, Microsoft sues Lindows—then pays $20
million, SEATTLE TIMES, July 20, 2004, http://old.seattletimes.com
/html/businesstechnology/2001983512_lindows20.html.
DIRK GEERAERTS, THEORIES OF LEXICAL SEMANTICS 26-27 (2010)
[hereinafter GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS].
TERRY CROWLEY & CLAIRE BOWERN, AN INTRODUCTION TO HISTORICAL
LINGUISTICS 200 (4th ed. 2010); Willem B. Hollmann, Semantic Change, in
ENGLISH LANGUAGE: DESCRIPTION, VARIATION AND CONTEXT 525, 528
(Jonathan Culpeper et al. eds., 2009).
Kiss, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/103
691 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (“Name for a small sweetmeat or piece of
confectionery; a sugar-plum.”).
See infra notes 58-61 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 27-37 and accompanying text. The protection also provides
an incentive for those vendors to maintain consistent quality because the
vendor is allowed to internalize the value of the reputation or goodwill
acquired in the trademark.
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consumer perception if the court concludes a potential mark
ever carried generic meaning.
Trademark incapacity might be justified if generic terms
rarely acquired a critical mass of source significance. If that
were so, we might prevent costly errors by ignoring the
occasional case where a generic term undergoes restriction and
its primary meaning narrows to source significance. But in
fact, generic terms take on source signifying meaning quite
often. Case law provides multiple examples where courts have
ignored evidence that consumers perceive an ostensible generic
product designation as a source-signifying trademark.21 In
addition, linguistic research suggests that restriction happens
frequently—perhaps more frequently than any other form of
semantic shift.22 Unfortunately, courts and scholars mistakenly
assume that the shift of a generic term to source-signifying
meaning happens infrequently precisely because courts almost
never grant trademark protection to former generic terms.23
The error-cost rationale for trademark incapacity is thus
circular. Indeed, ignoring restriction that occurs to generic
terms—and the development of source significance in the eyes
of consumers—may well increase error in trademark
litigation.24
Scholars and courts have also defended trademark
incapacity on normative grounds, identifying several interlaced
justifications for the doctrine: concerns about granting mark
owners monopoly power or causing language depletion; a
general distrust of trademark-owning incumbents; and an
application of the functionality doctrine due to a perception
that generic terms are immutable like tangible product
features. However, understanding how trademark acquisition
reflects the broader phenomena of semantic shift provides an
avenue for refuting those justifications.25
The Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I outlines
trademark law’s commitment to consumer search and
consumer perception, before turning to the conflict between
that ostensible commitment and the doctrine of trademark
incapacity. Some scholars have offered critiques of trademark
incapacity, recognizing the problem of ontological rejections of
source significance without providing a theory for why it is
important to acknowledge language change in the ex ante

21
22
23
24
25

See infra Part I.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part I.C
See infra Part III.A.1.
See infra Part III.A.2.
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generic context as well as in other contexts. Part II provides
such a theoretical basis, beginning with a brief discussion of
the drivers of semantic shift before describing how trademark
acquisition is a form of semantic shift. While trademark law
reflects many regular forms of semantic shift, the doctrine of
trademark incapacity drives a wedge between the law of
trademark acquisition and the reality of semantic shift. The
shift from generic term to source-signifying trademark is an
example of restriction, one of the most frequently occurring
forms of semantic shift and one that increases the information
conveyed by the restricted form.26 Part III makes the case for
abandoning the doctrine of trademark incapacity in favor of the
primary significance test already applied in cases where a
protected mark loses trademark significance and slides into
genericness as a product designation.
I.

CONSUMER
INCAPACITY

PERCEPTION

AND

TRADEMARK

As this Part explains, the goal of trademark law is to lower
consumer search costs and prevent consumer confusion. The
dominant justification for trademark law is thus tied to
consumer perception. The doctrine of trademark incapacity,
however, ignores evidence of consumer perception and instead
disqualifies marks derived from generic terms due to their
etymology. The ostensible rationales underlying the doctrine of
trademark incapacity cannot justify the refusal to consider
evidence of consumer perception.
A.

Trademark Law, Consumer Perception, and
Consumer Confusion

The dominant rationale for trademark protection is
reducing consumer search costs.27 A trademark can serve as an

26
27

APRIL M.S. MCMAHON, UNDERSTANDING LANGUAGE CHANGE 178-79 (1994).
Cf. Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L.
REV. 1171, 1190 n.93 (2005) (“[I]f trademark law were to abandon
consumer benefit as a foundation, there could simply be no plausible
theoretical foundation for trademark regulation.”). While reducing
consumer search costs is the dominant rationale, some scholars have
provided an alternate justification for trademark protection. See, e.g.,
Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L.
REV. 2020, 2025 (2005) [hereinafter Beebe, Search and Persuasion]
(proposing two varieties of consumer sophistication: search sophistication,
the ability of consumers to distinguish between similar trademarks; and
persuasion sophistication, their capacity to choose products independently
of marketer influence); Margaret Chon, Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in
Global Values Networks, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 935 (2014) (reexamining
trademark law through the heuristic of brand citizenship); Mark P.

118

THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

indicator that products bearing the mark originate from a
single seller.28 Consumers can thus rely on the trademark to
identify products they wish to buy, which reduces the cost of
finding those products. While there are other accounts
justifying trademark protection,29 this Article will critique
trademark incapacity from within the dominant account.
Questions of whether a trademark qualifies for protection
and whether a trademark has been infringed are answered by
assessing consumer perception of that mark.30 Some
trademarks are considered inherently capable of distinguishing
the goods or services of one producer from those of others, and
it is presumed that consumers see them as source-signifying.
Other trademarks are seen as merely descriptive of some
quality or feature of the product or service, and protection is
extended only if the mark acquires a secondary, sourcesignifying meaning.31 Distinguishing a term that is merely
descriptive (and is thus unprotectable) from one that is
inherently distinctive or has acquired secondary meaning (and
is thus protectable) requires assessing whether consumers
better understand a given term to describe a characteristic of a

28

29

30

31

McKenna, Trademark Use and the Problem of Source, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV.
773, 821 (criticizing the failure of the consumer search cost theory to limit
the expansion of trademark rights); Jeremy N. Sheff, Biasing Brands, 32
CARDOZO L. REV. 1245 (2011) (arguing that psychological and marketing
research can manipulate consumer perception, weakening the consumer
search account).
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Trademark Law: An Economic
Perspective, 30 J.L. & ECON. 265, 269 (1987).
See, e.g., Jake Linford, Trademark Owner as Adverse Possessor:
Productive Use and Property Acquisition, 63 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 703
(2013) (describing how trademark law bases protection on productive use
by the mark owner) [hereinafter Linford, Adverse Possessor]; Mark P.
McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1839, 1841 (2007) (arguing that “trademark law, like all
unfair competition law, sought to protect producers from illegitimate
diversions of their trade by competitors”).
See In re Bayer Aktiengesellschaft, 488 F.3d 960, 966 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(discussing the use of online resources to measure consumer perception);
Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1395 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“Consumer perceptions are relevant in determining whether a noninherently distinctive mark has acquired secondary meaning and should
therefore be treated as a strong mark.”) (internal citations omitted); G.
Heileman Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 996 n.10
(7th Cir. 1989) (“[C]onsumer perception should be measured by
considering the mark as applied to the product in question and the
reaction of the consumer audience to which the trademark is directed in
the marketplace.”) (internal citations omitted).
See infra notes 121-144 and accompanying text.
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product, or to signify the source of the product itself.32 The
perception of “the average potential consumer in the context of
the existing marketplace and exposed to the information
currently available in the marketplace” weighs heavily in
assessing whether a mark merits protection, or whether
confusion has occurred.33
Trademark law is likewise aimed at preventing or
correcting “confusion among consumers regarding the origin of
the goods [or services] offered” to the public.34 Consumer
confusion often occurs when a junior user adopts a mark
identical or sufficiently similar to the mark of a senior user to
identify the same or similar products or services.35 That
confusion can increase consumer search costs.36 Trademark law
thus bars not only the use of a mark identical to that of the
senior user, but also the use of a mark that is confusingly
similar to the senior user’s mark.37
While the dominant rationale for trademark protection is to
prevent consumer confusion, there are aspects of trademark
law that are surprisingly disconnected from consumer
perception. This Article focuses on one such divergence:
trademark law has developed a doctrine of “trademark
incapacity,”38 more commonly referred to as a principle of de
facto secondary meaning.39 If a court concludes that the mark
was ever a generic term, any source-signifying meaning the
See, e.g., Sands, Taylor & Wood Co. v. Quaker Oats Co., 978 F.2d 947, 952
(7th Cir. 1992).
33 Heileman, 873 F.2d at 995; see also Jeanne C. Fromer & Mark A. Lemley,
The Audience in Intellectual Property Infringement, 112 MICH. L. REV.
1251, 1260 (2014).
34 Gibson Guitar Corp. v. Paul Reed Smith Guitars, LP, 423 F.3d 539, 551
(6th Cir. 2005); see also Ann Bartow, Likelihood of Confusion, 41 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 721, 722 (2004) (“Confusion among consumers is the grave
iniquity against which trademark laws and jurisprudence are intended to
guard.”).
35 Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, The Merchandising Right: Fragile
Theory or Fait Accompli?, 54 EMORY L.J. 461, 482 (2005) (“An
infringement of a trademark is one that increases consumer search costs,
normally by confusing consumers.”).
36 James Burrough, Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 276 (7th Cir.
1976) (“The trademark laws exist not to ‘protect’ trademarks, but, as
above indicated, to protect the consuming public from confusion,
concomitantly protecting the trademark owner’s right to a non-confused
public.”).
37 Am. Steel Foundries v. Robertson, 269 U.S. 372, 381 (1926).
38 3 CALLMANN, supra note 9, § 20:33 (coining the term “trademark
incapacity”).
39 See, e.g., Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological
Approach to Trademark Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 730 (1999) [hereinafter
Dinwoodie, Ontology].
32
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mark may have later acquired is dismissed as mere “de facto
secondary meaning” bearing no legal significance.40 The generic
term can never acquire trademark protection, even if
consumers have come to identify the mark with a specific
brand or product. The next Section describes the doctrine of
trademark incapacity in more detail, highlighting how that
doctrine is disconnected from the consumer search and
consumer perception justifications for trademark law.
B.

Trademark Incapacity in the Case Law

Under the doctrine of trademark incapacity,41 a term that is
generic ex ante for a genus of goods or services cannot be
transformed into a trademark by the commercial behavior that
typically provides a basis for acquiring secondary meaning.42
As stated by the court in Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc.,43 generic terms, which “refe[r], or ha[ve] come to be
understood as referring, to the genus of which the particular
product is a species,” cannot acquire trademark protection.44
The rationale for trademark incapacity is that “no matter how
much money and effort the user of a generic term has poured

40

41
42

43

44

See, e.g., Hunt Masters, Inc. v. Landry’s Seafood Restaurant, Inc., 240
F.3d 251, 254-255 (4th Cir. 2001) (holding that because crab house was
obviously generic for a restaurant that served crab, “it [was] not necessary
to determine whether the term [became] generic through common use,
rendering Hunt’s customer survey irrelevant”); Liquid Controls Corp. v.
Liquid Control Corp., 802 F.2d 934, 938 n.6 (7th Cir. 1986) (discounting
study that indicated source significance of “liquid control” as not relevant
to whether term is generic); Miller Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing
Co., 605 F.2d 990, 995 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding that because “light” for lowcalorie beer was obviously generic, “proof” of secondary meaning “would
not advance [plaintiff’s] trademark claim, because . . . if a word is generic
it ‘can never become a trademark’”); Lindows III, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1864,
(instructing jury that a genericness inquiry should consider the time the
claimant began using the mark, and refusing to instruct the jury that a
trademark is valid if the mark was generic when the claimant entered the
market but had subsequently acquired source significance); 2 J. THOMAS
MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 12:47
(describing how courts discount evidence of secondary meaning acquired
in generic terms) (4th ed. 2015).
See 3 CALLMANN, supra note 9, § 20:33.
See, e.g., In re Minnetonka, Inc., 212 U.S.P.Q. 772, 782 (T.T.A.B. 1981)
(defining a generic term as one “so highly descriptive that no quantum of
evidence of acquired distinctiveness is sufficient to qualify it for
registration under Section 2(f)”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 15 cmt. b (2007) (“[T]he public interest in maintaining
access to generic terms precludes the recognition of trademark rights.”).
537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976) (creating a hierarchy of conceptual trademark
strength based on the degree to which the mark directly describes the
product or service).
Id. at 9.
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into promoting the sale of its merchandise, and what success it
has achieved in securing public identification, it cannot deprive
competing manufacturers of the product of the right to call an
article by its name.”45 Evidence that consumers perceive the
term as a trademark is thus ignored or dismissed.46
This bar against a generic term acquiring distinctiveness is
easiest to understand at the extreme. For example, in the
absence of the trademark incapacity doctrine, a seller of
computers might still find it difficult to secure COMPUTER as
a mark for its goods. It is unlikely that the seller could
persuade a critical mass of consumers that COMPUTER
designates only the seller’s computers marketed by that
particular producer. The difficulty of establishing such a shift
in meaning suggests that a prophylactic rule like the
trademark incapacity doctrine might have some use at the far
edge of the Abercrombie spectrum.47
There are, however, many cases where semantic shift has
been measured, source significance acquired, and evidence of
consumer perception nevertheless ignored. For example, in
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli,48 the court marshaled the
ex ante bar in dismissing evidence that 98 percent of
consumers viewed the term HOG as a source signifier for
Harley-Davidson’s motorcycles, rather than as a generic
designation for large motorcycles.49 In another case,
Hotels.com, L.P. applied to register HOTELS.COM as a service
mark for its online hotel booking services.50 Hotels.com
presented evidence that 76 percent of survey respondents
identified HOTELS.COM as a trademark instead of a common
or generic name.51 But the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
(“TTAB”) concluded that HOTELS.COM was generic because
“hotels” was a generic designation for the provision of hotel
booking services and the addition of “.com” was insufficient to
permit trademark protection.52 The TTAB thus refused to
45
46

47
48
49

50
51
52

Id.
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 304 (3d Cir. 1986)
(“Underlying the genericness doctrine is the principle that some terms so
directly signify the nature of the product that interests of competition
demand that other producers be able to use them even if terms have or
might become identified with a source and so acquire ‘de facto’ secondary
meaning.”).
See infra Part III.A.1
164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999).
Jerre B. Swann, Genericism Rationalized, 89 TRADEMARK REP. 639, 654
n.96 (1999) (citing the Grottanelli Appellate Record at A76).
In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
In re Hotels.com, L.P., 87 U.S.P.Q.2d 1100, 1110-12 (T.T.A.B. 2008).
Id. at 1100-11. But see In re Steelbuilding.com, 415 F.3d 1293, 1296-97
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credit the survey and affirmed the trademark examiner’s
decision to refuse registration. The TTAB noted, however, that
should the applicant persuade a court on appeal that the mark
was not ex ante generic, the survey provided sufficient evidence
of acquired distinctiveness to support registration. Thus, the
Board’s determination of ex ante genericness was fatal to the
registration of the mark even in the face of otherwise
persuasive evidence of that HOTELS.COM had acquired
secondary meaning.
Additionally, the trademark incapacity doctrine often
tempts courts to invoke the ex ante bar in cases where the
mark is a compound word or phrase, despite the wellestablished “anti-dissection” rule that trademarks are
protected as a whole and should be evaluated as a whole.53
Courts mistakenly apply the ex ante bar to compound marks
whose components appear clearly generic or “highly
descriptive,”54 even if the compound term as a whole has not

(Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Oppedahl & Larson LLP, 373 F.3d 1171, 1175 (Fed.
Cir. 2004) (“[I]n unique circumstances a [top level domain indicator] could
perform a source-indicating function.”). The court in Oppedahl & Larson
explained:
Only in rare instances will the addition of a TLD indicator to a
descriptive term operate to create a distinctive mark. In those rare
instances, a term that is not distinctive by itself may acquire some
additional meaning from the addition of a TLD, such as “.com,”
“.net,” etc. In those unusual circumstances, the addition of the TLD
can show Internet-related distinctiveness, intimating some
“Internet feature” of the item.
53

54

Id.
See, e.g., Estate of P.D. Beckwith, Inc., v. Comm’r of Patents, 252 U.S.
538, 545-46 (1920) (“The commercial impression of a trade-mark is
derived from it as a whole, not from its elements separated and considered
in detail. For this reason it should be considered in its entirety.”); see also
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 379 (7th Cir. 1976)
(ruling that the decision by the district court to break the EVEREADY
mark down into its component pieces was clearly erroneous because
“[w]ords which could not individually become a trademark may become
one when taken together”); 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40 § 11:27.
Under § 1052(f) of the Lanham Act, a descriptive term can be presumed to
have acquired distinctiveness upon a showing of five years of
“substantially exclusive and continuous use.” 15 U.S.C. § 1052(f) (2006).
That presumption was historically relaxed for marks that are “so highly
descriptive” they were deemed incapable of acquiring secondary meaning.
In re Institutional Investor, Inc., 229 U.S.P.Q. 614, 617-18 (C.C.P.A. 1986)
(affirming decision by the trademark examiner that the mark
INTERNATIONAL BANKING INSTITUTE for international banking
seminars was “so highly descriptive or generic that it is utterly incapable
of functioning as a trademark or acquiring distinctiveness, no matter
what quantity of evidence of alleged distinctiveness or secondary meaning
is submitted”). Some opinions suggest a relationship between the
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been used as a product designation in the past. For example, in
A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman,55 the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit held that the term CHOCOLATE FUDGE for
soda was generic for a rich, chocolate-flavored soda, although
CHOCOLATE FUDGE had never before been used in that
combination for that purpose.56 Likewise, TURBODIESEL was
held generic for diesel engines even though the compound term
had not previously been used by competitors or consumers in
connection with diesel engines.57
The trademark incapacity doctrine has not been uniformly
applied, but the exceptions prove the rule. On occasion, the
TTAB has recognized acquired distinctiveness in a formerly
generic term. For example, in an unpublished opinion, the
TTAB reversed a refusal by the Trademark Office to register
the mark KISSES for chocolate candy.58 The TTAB recognized
that the Hershey Company had acquired distinctiveness in
KISSES, building up secondary meaning over ninety years.59
This secondary meaning was reflected in a survey where 80
percent of respondents identified KISSES as a trademark.60

55
56

descriptiveness of the proposed mark and the proof required to establish
secondary meaning. See, e.g., Yamaha Int’l Corp. v. Hoshino Gakki Co.,
Ltd., 840 F.2d 1572, 1581 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“[T]he more descriptive the
term, the greater the evidentiary burden to establish secondary
meaning.”).
808 F.2d 291 (3d Cir. 1986).
The CHOCOLATE FUDGE case was a close call. The Seventh Circuit
initially affirmed a preliminary injunction against a competitor’s use of
the CHOCOLATE FUDGE designation, A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess
Beverages, Inc., 796 F.2d 903 (7th Cir. 1986), but later held that collateral
estoppel precluded reconsideration of the Third Circuit’s finding of
genericness, A.J. Canfield Co. v. Vess Beverages, Inc., 859 F.2d 36 (7th
Cir. 1988). The Third Circuit created its own genericness test outside of
the primary significance test:
[W]hen a producer introduces a product that differs from an
established product class in a significant, functional characteristic,
and uses the common descriptive term of that characteristic as its
name, that new product becomes its own genus, and the term
denoting the genus becomes generic if there is no commonly used
alternative that effectively communicates the same functional
information.

57

58
59
60

Honickman, 808 F.2d at 293.
Cummins Engine Co. v. Continental Motors Corp., 359 F.2d 892 (C.C.P.A.
1966).
In re Holmstead, Inc., No. 75/183,278 (T.T.A.B. Apr. 4, 2000).
Id. at 11.
Id. at 8. As the Board noted, 16.5 percent of respondents identified the
KISSES mark as a generic term, compared with 9 percent who identified
MILK DUDS as a generic term, and 4.4 percent who identified M&M’s as
a generic term.
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The court recognized secondary meaning despite substantial
evidence amassed by the examiner that kiss started out as a
generic designation for a small piece of confection or chocolate
candy.61
There is at least one other limited exception to the
trademark incapacity doctrine. Marks that lose protection
because of a slide into genericness have occasionally reacquired
distinctiveness and thus regained trademark protection. Both
SINGER for sewing machines and GOODYEAR RUBBER for
“goods produced by the processes known as Goodyear’s
invention” were found generic by the Supreme Court in the
nineteenth century,62 but both marks reacquired trademark
protection in the twentieth century.63 These trademark
resurrection cases are perhaps outliers, because such
restorations have occurred infrequently.64 However, trademark
resurrection cases still indicate that the ex ante bar is not
uniformly applied, at least in cases where the mark acquired
secondary meaning before falling into genericness. The
trademark incapacity doctrine thus appears not to consistently
reach marks that held secondary meaning before they became
generic.
At its extreme, the doctrine of trademark incapacity is
absurd. In the middle ages, code was a term both for a baptism
robe or chrism cloth, and for pitch or cobbler’s wax.65 These
meanings are obsolete and have been for centuries. It would be
odd for a court to conclude that CODE is generic if used as a

61

62

63

64

65

Id. at 4. See also Hershey Co. v. Promotion in Motion, Inc., No. 07-1601,
2011 WL 5508481, at *9 (D.N.J. Nov. 7, 2011) (unpublished) (concluding,
in light of “Hershey’s multiple Teflon surveys offering direct evidence of
the primary significance of KISSES as a brand to consumers . . . that a
reasonable fact finder could not find the KISSES mark generic”).
Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Goodyear’s Rubber
Mfg. Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 128 U.S. 598, 602 (1888).
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Briley, 207 F.2d 519, 520 n.3 (5th Cir. 1953) (affirming
district court decision that Singer had, “by the constant and exclusive use
of the name ‘Singer’ in designating sewing machines and other articles
manufactured and sold by it and in advertising the same continuously and
widely—recaptured from the public domain the same ‘Singer’”); Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co. v. H. Rosenthal Co., 246 F. Supp. 724, 729 (D. Minn.
1965) (holding that while the Supreme Court found that “Goodyear
Rubber” was descriptive and could not be appropriated as a trademark,
that case had “no bearing on the issue of secondary meaning”).
Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1832 (2007); 2 MCCARTHY, supra
note 40, § 12:30.
Code, n.2, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry
/35579 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014); Code, n.3, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/35580 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
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trademark for baptistery clothing or for a sealant.
Nevertheless, a strong form of trademark incapacity would bar
recognition of any source significance, because as a historical
matter, code was once a term used to describe both things.
Trademark incapacity is not required by the language of
the Lanham Act, which articulates the scope of federal
trademark protection. Section 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act
authorizes the Trademark Office to reject an application to
register a trademark if it determines that the mark “is merely
descriptive” of the goods or services of the applicant.66 But mere
descriptiveness is not among the justifications for ignoring
subsequently acquired source significance.67 Likewise, Section
14 specifies that a trademark registration may be cancelled if
the mark becomes generic, and mandates use of a primary
significance test to determine whether or not the mark has
become generic.68 There is no statutory requirement for
treating a generic term as though it cannot acquire source
significance.69
Why, then, apply the doctrine of trademark incapacity? The
next section summarizes standard justifications for trademark
incapacity as well as critiques of the doctrine. This summary
lays the groundwork for a discussion in Part II of what theories
of semantic shift can teach us about trademark acquisition, and
particularly the acquisition of source significance in a generic
term.

66
67

68

69

15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (Lanham Act (L.A.) § 2(e)(1)).
Id. § 1052(f) (noting that, with the exception of provisions other than
§ 2(e)(1), “nothing in this chapter shall prevent the registration of a mark
used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s
goods in commerce”).
Id. § 1064(3) (L.A. § 14(3)). In 1984, Congress passed the Trademark
Clarification Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-260, 98 Stat. 3335, to reverse the
effect of the decision in Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group,
Inc., 611 F.2d 296 (9th Cir. 1979), and to restate the traditional test for ex
post genericness, which inquired into the primary significance of the term
to the purchasing public. The primary significance test is now part of the
statutory language, at least with regard to the generislide of a registered
mark. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (L.A. § 14(3)) (“The primary significance of the
registered mark to the relevant public rather than purchaser motivation
shall be the test for determining whether the registered mark has become
the generic name of goods or services on or in connection with which it has
been used.”).
If a generic term were construed to “compris[e] matter that, as a whole, is
functional,” that would provide a basis under § 1052(e)(5) for denying
registration, or under § 1064(3) for cancelling the registration. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1052(e)(5), 1064(3) (L.A. §§ 2(e)(5), 14(3)). I argue in Part III.A.2(3),
infra, that a generic term is different from a functional feature.
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Standard Justifications for and Prior Critiques
of Trademark Incapacity

The standard justifications for trademark incapacity,
discussed in more detail in Part III.A, fall into two overlapping
categories. First, if a legitimate shift from a generic term to a
source-signifying trademark happens rarely, the trademark
incapacity doctrine might serve as a prophylactic rule to
prevent courts from erroneously finding a source-signifying
shift that does not exist, while avoiding the administrative
costs that come with an inquiry into the alleged change.70 For
example, Thomas McCarthy has considered at length whether
a generic term may be “elevated over time into a trademark,”71
concluding that such an event is extraordinarily rare.72
McCarthy posits that such a shift would require “a radical
change in consumer perception and usage of words,” which he
identifies as happening only twice—in the Singer and Goodyear
cases.73 The mistake, however, is in arguing that the requisite
change in consumer perception rarely occurs because courts
have rarely extended legal significance to it. In fact, the case
law is full of circumstances where a claimant provides evidence
of a shift from genericness to source significance, but the courts
discount it.74
Second, justifications for trademark incapacity articulate
three intertwined rationales grounded in competition policy.
One rationale argues that granting protection in “the common
name of an article” may provide the first entrant with
something approaching monopoly power to sell that product.75
This concern is sometimes articulated as unease about
“language depletion,”76 the notion that too many common terms
might be appropriated as property, leaving new entrants
70

71
72
73
74
75

76

Cf. Robert G. Bone, Enforcement Costs and Trademark Puzzles, 90 VA. L.
REV. 2099 (2004) [hereinafter Bone, Enforcement Costs]; see also infra
Part III.A.1.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:30.
Id.
Id.; see also supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.B.
See, e.g., Am. Aloe Corp. v. Aloe Creme Labs., Inc., 420 F.2d 1248, 1252
(7th Cir. 1970); see also infra notes 210, 213-225 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g Inc., 971 F.2d 302,
306 (9th Cir. 1992) (stating that generic trademarks receive no protection
and that the holder of such a mark obtains no right to exclude others, so
that producers may not “deplete the stock of useful words by asserting
exclusive rights in them”). But cf. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.,
Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 169 (1995) (rejecting a similar “color depletion” theory
as a basis for denying trademark protection for the use of a particular
color on a good).
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without access to words needed to sell competing goods to the
public.77 A related rationale favors protecting competitors over
incumbents. These competition concerns are seen by others as
a facet of the functionality doctrine,78 which bars trademark
protection in product features that are essential elements of a
given product.79
Increasing competition is often seen as directly correlated
with lowering consumer search costs,80 but competition policy
and consumer confusion can pull in different directions. Some
consumers will be confused in almost any conflict between
junior and senior users of trademarks. Trademark law
nevertheless ignores the confusion of those consumers unless
the mark is distinct enough to justify concluding that many
consumers see it as source-signifying, or in cases where limited
numbers of consumers have testified of confusion, but a
plaintiff’s case is otherwise not particularly strong.81 Thus,
even if some consumers see a generic term as source-signifying
and are consequently confused when competing producers use
the term, the law might tolerate the confusion to preserve
competition.82

77

78

79

80

81

82

Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1227, 1242 (2008).
See, e.g., Dinwoodie, Ontology, supra note 39, at 729-30. See also infra
notes 235-239 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 164 (“The functionality doctrine prevents
trademark law, which seeks to promote competition by protecting a firm’s
reputation, from instead inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a
producer to control a useful product feature.”).
See, e.g., Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 14
(1st Cir. 2008); Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Grounding
Trademark Law Through Trademark Use, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 1345,
1373-74 (2008) (“[T]he ultimate purpose of reducing consumer search costs
is to facilitate the operation of [the] marketplace. If trademark law
interferes with competition, trademark law must give way, or it will end
up destroying the village in order to save it.”).
See, e.g., McDonald’s Corp. v. Shop at Home, Inc., 82 F. Supp. 2d 801, 810
(M.D. Tenn. 2000) (noting that sixteen instances of actual confusion
“borders on insignificant” for a mass marketer like McDonald’s).
See Soc’y of Fin. Examiners v. Nat’l Ass’n of Certified Fraud Examiners
Inc., 41 F.3d 223, 225 (5th Cir. 1995) (vacating summary judgment and
injunctive relief in plaintiff’s favor because a question of fact remained on
whether the purported mark was generic, and noting that “[e]ven total
confusion, however, is irrelevant if [the purported mark] constitutes a
‘generic’ mark”); cf. Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and
Consumer Search Costs on the Internet, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 777, 793 (2004)
[hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, Consumer Search Costs] (“[T]he genericness
doctrine can impose search costs on consumers, particularly when a oncefamous mark such as ‘aspirin’ or ‘thermos’ becomes generic.”).
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Critics of trademark incapacity have taken different
positions on the justifications outlined above. Scholars like
Graeme Dinwoodie have noted the problem of handling
trademarks ontologically.83 In the words of Thomas McCarthy,
the doctrine of trademark incapacity is problematic because it
empowers a court to “assume that which is to be decided.”84 But
even McCarthy falls prey to the mistaken notion that a shift
from a generic term to a source-signifying designation is, by
nature, vanishingly rare.85 Louis Altman instead urges courts
to inquire whether “there has been a complete transformation
of [generic into source-signifying] meaning,”86 in essence
requiring a complete replacement of any generic meaning with
secondary meaning before trademark protection may vest.87
Some critics see genericness and source significance as
opposite sides of the same coin.88 This binary view
misapprehends the issue. As discussed in more detail in Part
II, a word can have multiple senses, and can even have
conflicting meanings. Likewise, a term used as a trademark
has the potential to bear both product identifying and sourcesignifying meanings, at least in the minds of different
consumers, and perhaps in the mind of the same consumer at
different times.89 The binary view thus misses some of the
complexity that semantic shift theories can help us appreciate.

83
84

85

86

87

88

89

Dinwoodie, Ontology, supra note 39, at 729.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:47; see also 3 CALLMANN, supra note 9,
§ 20:33.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:47 (proposing leaving a slight opening
for asserting a trademark in a formerly generic name “to accommodate
the rare and extraordinary event that a generic name over a period of
years loses it[s] generic significance and achieves trademark
significance.”); cf. infra Part II.B.
3 CALLMANN, supra note 9, § 20:33. Altman nevertheless concedes the
anti-competitive argument “if the mark retains a substantial vestige of its
original generic or descriptive meaning.” Id.
See infra notes 282-285 and accompanying text for a critique of the
replacement standard.
See, e.g., Marc C. Levy, From Genericism to Trademark Significance:
Deconstructing the De Facto Secondary Meaning Doctrine, 95 TRADEMARK
REP. 1197, 1202 (2005) (“[T]here is no such thing as a ‘generic’ word with
secondary meaning.”) (quoting Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing
Corp., 503 F. Supp. 896, 906 (D.R.I. 1980), rev’d, 655 F.2d 5 (1st Cir.
1981)).
Cf. Ralph H. Folsom & Larry L. Teply, Trademarked Generic Words, 89
YALE L.J. 1323, 1339-40 (1980) (discussing three possible types of
consumer perception of “trademarked generic words”); Heymann, supra
note 1, at 1342 (arguing that consumers can hold generic and sourcesignifying meanings in mind simultaneously).
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Other scholars see trademark incapacity as a subset of
functionality. For example, Vanessa Bowman Pierce has
argued that the genericness inquiry should be subsumed into a
functionality inquiry.90 Pierce’s concept of functionality,
however, is confined to preventing the protection of “core words
to which all competitors may need access.” Thus, if “effective
competition is possible” without the use of the term, “neither
functionality nor genericism should preclude at least qualified
protection” of the term.91 Vincent Palladino, on the other hand,
expresses concern that at least “for products that are not
unique, [equating] functionality and genericness seems
unsound” because a competitor always needs to copy a
functional element in order to compete, but does not need to
use a word to compete “when the word has become associated
with the products of only one producer.”92 Palladino’s argument
is somewhat conclusory, and he buys into the same binary
structure that plagues other critiques, but he points in the
direction of the real conundrum, one that focuses on the
importance of change.93 Functional features do not change, but
language does.
These critiques nevertheless fail to account for why it is
important to focus on current rather than historic language
usage. To encapsulate the argument that follows, language is
dynamic, and language change appears to occur more rapidly
now than at any point in history.94 Part II outlines how those

90

91
92

93

94

Vanessa Bowman Pierce, If It Walks Like a Duck and Quacks Like a Duck,
Shouldn’t It Be a Duck?: How a “Functional” Approach Ameliorates the
Discontinuity Between the “Primary Significance” Tests for Genericness
and Secondary Meaning, 37 N.M. L. REV. 147, 185 (2007).
Id.
Vincent N. Palladino, Assessing Trademark Significance: Genericness,
Secondary Meaning and Surveys, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 857, 869 (2002).
Id.; see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 15:24 (recognizing the inherent
“fluidity” of trademark rights in his criticism of the strong form of de facto
secondary meaning).
The editors of the Barhart Dictionary of New English reported five
thousand new words, or neologisms, between 1963 and 1972, roughly five
hundred per year. See John Algeo, Where Do All the New Words Come
From?, 55 AM. SPEECH 264, 267 (1980). But in the 1989 edition of the
OED, editor John Simpson stated in the preface that “[t]he pace of
inclusion of new words has been increased to a rate of about 4,000 per
year.” John Simpson, Introduction to THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY
(2d ed. 1989). Other authors have noted spikes in neologism during
periods of great creative and literary output. See, e.g., GEOFFREY HUGHES,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH WORDS 27 (2000) (identifying a spike in neologisms
at the turn of the seventeenth century). Communication technology also
increases the rate with which new words are adopted. See, e.g., ALVIN
TOFFLER, FUTURE SHOCK 151-54 (1970) (describing how A-OK effectively
entered the lexicon overnight as the American public heard an astronaut
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changes typically occur. In particular, Part II.B explains how
restriction—a narrowing shift in the meaning of a word from
any member of a broad category to a prototypical member of
that category—is the most common form of semantic shift. In
Part III, the Article applies these findings to the trademark
incapacity doctrine, refuting the functionality and error-cost
rationales that are presumed to provide a basis for the
doctrine.
II.

LANGUAGE CHANGE AND TRADEMARK MEANING

Semantic shift is the creation of new meaning, either by
adding new senses to existing words, or adding new words to
the lexicon. Similarly, creation of the source significance
necessary to qualify for trademark protection is a form of
semantic shift. Like semantic shift generally, the creation of
trademark meaning is driven by the need to communicate. And
like semantic shift, trademark law provides rules for how to
resolve confusing ambiguity. In both linguistic and legal
realms, the effectiveness of the communication and the ease of
processing the ambiguity depend largely on the nature of the
relationship between a new word or meaning and the older
word or words from which it is derived.
Trademark acquisition also resembles semantic shift in
another way. Semantic shift happens in regular patterns that
linguists identify as occurring repeatedly over time and across
languages. Each stop on the Abercrombie spectrum correlates
with a category of semantic relationship, with one notable
exception. Restriction of meaning occurs when the meaning of a
word designating a category of things is narrowed to designate
a prototypical member of the category.95 By many accounts,
restriction is the most common form of semantic shift.96 But as
discussed in Part I.B, trademark law treats the restrictive shift
from a generic product category to a source-signifying
trademark as forbidden, based in part on the mistaken premise
that restriction in the trademark context is extremely rare.
This Part presents evidence regarding the frequency of
restriction and how restriction occurs. Part III then considers
whether the justifications for trademark incapacity hold water
in light of this evidence, and how we might change trademark
law to more closely match our best understanding of how
language actually changes.

95
96

use it during a televised flight).
See infra notes 145-146, 152-157 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 16, at 26-27.
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Semantic Shift and the Abercrombie Spectrum

Living languages are not static. The lexicon of a given
language—the total number of words available to speakers of
that language—must continually make room for new entries.97
Two motivations drive this creation of new meaning, or
semantic shift.98 First, semantic shift is motivated by the
speaker’s need to say new things and communicate more
effectively, which encourages the speaker to “risk” a semantic
innovation.99 If the innovation fails, the attempt is dismissed as
a “nonce-formation.”100 If the innovation spreads to other
members of the speech community, it first becomes an
“occasional” or context-specific meaning.101 Occasional or
innovative uses that gain sufficient popularity may become
context-independent, “usual” meanings.102
Adding a new meaning to an old word is an efficient means
of saying something new in a recognizable way. For instance,
the torpedo, a self-propelled submarine explosive, was named
for a type of stingray.103 Andreas Blank has proposed that the
inventor called it a torpedo because he thought that “this was a
pretty convincing metaphor” for the way the explosive device
moved through the water and could surprise its target.104
On the other hand, introducing new meanings to a given
word can also cause confusing ambiguity.105 A listener or
reader faced with conflicting meanings may find it difficult to
97

98

99

100
101

102

103
104
105

See, for example, omnishambles, a new word coined in an episode of the
British television satire In the Thick of It. Omnishambles, n., OXFORD
DICTIONARIES,
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/English
/omnishambles (last visited Nov. 7, 2014) (“n., British informal, a
situation that has been comprehensively mismanaged, characterized by a
string of blunders and miscalculations.”).
Dirk Geeraerts, Reclassifying Semantic Change, 4 QUADERNI DI SEMANTICA
217, 226, 234 (1983) [hereinafter Geeraerts, Reclassifying].
Andreas Blank, Why Do New Meanings Occur? A Cognitive Typology of
Motivations for Lexical Semantic Change, 61, 82-83 in HISTORICAL
SEMANTICS AND COGNITION (Andreas Blank & Peter Koch eds., 1999)
[hereinafter Blank, HISTORICAL SEMANTICS]; GEERAERTS,
LEXICAL
SEMANTICS, supra note 16, at 14-16 (suggesting that individual behavior
drives general language change over time) (citing HERMANN PAUL,
PRINZIPIEN DER SPRACHGESCHICHTE (5th ed. 1920)).
See Hollmann, supra note 17, at 535.
WILLIAM CROFT, EXPLAINING LANGUAGE CHANGE: AN EVOLUTIONARY
APPROACH 4-5, 105 (2000).
Traugott and Dasher refer to occasional meanings as “subjectification[s],”
which enter the lexicon as usual meanings once they are “fairly wide
spread.” TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 32.
Blank, supra note 99, at 62.
Id.
Id.
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understand the word. Ambiguity can thus increase the cost of
communicating, and to that extent may be inefficient and
undesirable.106 When such ambiguity arises, it can create what
scholars call homonymic tension or semantic overload.107
When confusing ambiguity arises, earlier meanings often
disappear as newer meanings are added.108 For example, the
Latin word persona gradually extended from “mask” to
“individual human being,” and then branched off to “parish
priest.” The resulting ambiguity was subsequently resolved by
adopting the variant parson for “parish priest,” and
abandoning persona for the same.109 Homonymic tension can
thus force some meanings out of the lexicon.110 When old
meanings disappear, ambiguity is reduced, making the
language more efficient.111
Semantic shift occurs in a variety of well-documented ways,
enabling new expression and tempering confusing ambiguity.
Sometimes a speaker makes up a whole new word. At
inception, such a word is monosemous, having only one
meaning.112 At other times, an existing word can be pressed
into service for new purposes. Words gain and lose meaning in
predictable patterns across languages,113 and these patterns
may shape the acquisition of trademark meaning, which at its
base is a type of semantic shift.114 Often, there is a relationship
between the existing word and its new meanings. There are six
standard categories of semantic change that build on existing
meaning:
restriction,
widening,
metaphoric
polysemy,

106
107

108

109

110

111

112
113
114

Geeraerts, Reclassifying, supra note 98 at 227.
STEPHEN ULLMANN, THE PRINCIPLES OF SEMANTICS: A LINGUISTIC APPROACH
TO MEANING 132 (1951) (quoting LEONARD ROBERT PALMER, AN
INTRODUCTION TO MODERN LINGUISTICS 113 (1936)); Geeraerts,
Reclassifying, supra note 98, at 226, 234.
Robert J. Menner, Multiple Meaning and Change of Meaning, 21
LANGUAGE 59, 61 (1945); see also id. at 67 (describing how the old French
word nice, meaning “ignorant” or “simple,” morphed into two senses—(1)
“fastidious,” “particular,” “refined,” which is also now nearly abandoned;
and (2) “agreeable”).
Joachim Grzega & Marion Schöner, English and General Historical
Lexicology: Materials for Onomasiology Seminars, 1 ONOMASIOLOGY
ONLINE MONOGRAPHS 1, 32 (2007).
Robert J. Menner, The Conflict of Homonyms in English, 12 LANG. 229,
234 (1936) [hereinafter Menner, Homonyms]; see also infra notes 167-170
and accompanying text.
ULLMANN, supra note 107, at 134 (language evolves “curative devices . . .
to resolve ‘intolerable’ conflicts”).
See infra notes 125-126 and accompanying text.
TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 3.
See infra notes 121-144 and accompanying text.
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metonymous polysemy, amelioration, and pejoration.115
Sometimes, new meanings are homonymous, or unrelated to
old meanings.116
Like semantic shift, trademark acquisition is speakerdriven, exhibits regular behavior, and appears to be shaped by
settled processing patterns used by listeners and readers when
construing lexical ambiguity. Reconsider Blank’s description of
how the torpedo was named.117 The motivation to find “a new
name in a concrete situation”118 drives the efforts of the
trademark owner to innovate. Each trademark is a symbol,
indicating that goods or services sold under that mark will be
of a consistent quality from a stable source.119 New meaning
added to an existing word can point toward that source.120
In Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc.,121 the
Second Circuit provided a spectrum of conceptual trademark
strength based on the relationship between the new trademark
and existing meanings of the appropriated word. As Judge
Friendly articulated in Abercrombie, the more inherently
distinctive a mark, the more readily it can bear source
significance and the easier it is for the hopeful mark owner to
acquire trademark protection.122
Some trademarks are fanciful, created for the purpose of
signifying products from a singular source, like XEROX for
photocopiers. Other marks are formed from preexisting words.
An arbitrary mark is formed when the word used is not related
to the product identified, like APPLE for computers. Suggestive
marks indirectly evoke some aspect of the product, like
SKINVISIBLE for transparent adhesive bandages, while

115

116
117
118
119
120

121
122

Elizabeth C. Traugott, Semantic Change: An Overview, in THE FIRST GLOT
INTERNATIONAL STATE-OF-THE-ARTICLE BOOK: THE LATEST IN LINGUISTICS
385 (Lisa Cheng & Rint Sybesma eds., 2000). I discuss the following types
of semantic shift in more detail infra: restriction, notes 151-173 and
accompanying text; widening, notes 174-180 and accompanying text; and
metaphoric and metonymous polysemy, notes 132-141 and accompanying
text. For a more detailed discussion of what metaphoric and metonymous
polysemy can teach us about the acquisition of secondary meaning in
suggestive and descriptive trademarks, see generally Linford, False
Dichotomy, supra note 7.
See infra notes 127-131 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 103-104 and accompanying text.
Blank, HISTORICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 99, at 62.
Beebe, Semiotic, supra note 1, at 623.
Robert G. Bone, Hunting Goodwill: A History of the Concept of Goodwill in
Trademark Law, 86 B.U. L. REV. 547, 563 (2006) [hereinafter Bone,
Goodwill].
537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976).
Id. at 9.
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descriptive marks, like SEALTIGHT for fasteners, are derived
from a quality or feature of the identified good or service.
Although the Abercrombie spectrum has been criticized as an
acontextual distraction from the key inquiries in trademark
law,123 the spectrum nevertheless plays a critical role in
trademark law’s inquiry into source significance.
As the following chart highlights, key points along the
Abercrombie spectrum mirror commonly understood forms of
semantic shift—for the most part.124 The sole outlier is the
treatment of a generic term in trademark law. While
restriction—the shift from a general to a narrow meaning—
occurs frequently and across languages, the restriction in
consumer perception when a word like “hog” shifts from
product type to product source is given no legal effect.
Semantic Category
(relationship between
existing words/meanings
and new word/meaning)

Abercrombie Spectrum
(relationship between mark
and product or good offered)

Monoseme: only one
meaning.

Fanciful mark: coined for
use as a trademark, not
derived from a preexisting
word.
Ex: XEROX for photocopiers.

Homonym: no connection
between existing meanings
and the new meaning.

Arbitrary mark: derived
from a pre-existing word
that has no connection with
the good or service sold.
Ex: APPLE for computers.

123

124

See, e.g., Lee et al., supra note 1, at 1078 (“[T]he Abercrombie
classification system is built on a faulty theoretical notion that semantic
meaning is the determinant of the extent to which consumers will esteem
a mark to be a source-indicator.”). But see Linford, False Dichotomy, supra
note 7, at 24-25.
In addition, research by Barton Beebe suggests that the mark’s place on
the Abercrombie spectrum correlates with the eventual outcome in
litigation. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for
Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1635-39 (2006)
[hereinafter Beebe, Multifactor].
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Metaphor: figurative
connection between
existing meanings and the
new sense.

135

Suggestive mark: preexisting word with some
connection to the mark, via
an imaginative leap.
Ex: SKINVISIBLE for
transparent adhesive
bandages; GLEEM for
toothpaste.

Metonym: some connection
between existing and new
sense, like feature for the
whole.
Ex: Green Beret from
distinctive headgear worn
by U.S. Army Special
Forces shifts to serve as a
nickname for the
organization and its
members.
Restriction: word formerly
used to describe general
category narrowed to
represent a prototypical
member of the category.

Descriptive mark: preexisting term with a clear
connection to the good or
service sold, via a direct
description of a product
feature.
Ex: SEALTIGHT for
fasteners.

Ex ante generic mark: word
whose meaning has shifted
from a class of products to
one particular brand.
Not an example: HOG for
Harley Davidson
motorcycles denied
protection, despite evidence
of shift, on grounds of
trademark incapacity.

A fanciful mark, like XEROX for photocopiers,125 is a
monoseme—a word with a singular meaning.126 Before XEROX

125

126

SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978). The term
XEROX is ostensibly drawn from the technical name for the photocopying
process, xerography, which itself is derived from Greek words for “dry”
and “writing,” ξηρό εγγράφως. Earle Hitchner, Xerox Is Not a Verb, in
PROPHETS IN THE DARK: HOW XEROX REINVENTED ITSELF AND BEAT BACK
THE JAPANESE 431, 431 (1992).
Monosemy is the condition where a word or phrase has a single meaning,
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was coined as a name for photocopying machines, that
combination of letters had no meaning. On the Abercrombie
scale, a fanciful mark is considered the most inherently
distinctive trademark. It is easy for consumers to perceive the
mark as a source signifier because the fanciful mark has no
prior relationship to the product identified.
An arbitrary mark, like APPLE for computers,127 has a
homonymous relationship to the word appropriated as a source
signifier. Homonyms are words that look and/or sound the
same,128 but have multiple unrelated meanings.129 For example,
while the word bank can refer to a financial institution or the
bank of a river, each meaning is homonymous, stemming from
independent sources.130 Historical and cognitive research

127

128

129

130

or where there is an absence of ambiguity. CHARLES RUHL, ON MONOSEMY:
A STUDY IN LINGUISTIC SEMANTICS (1989). A monoseme has a singular, and
often technical meaning. Monosemic, adj.2, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/253725 (last visited Mar. 10, 2015) (“Of a
word: having only one meaning”); cf. Mononym, n., OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/238541 (last visited Nov. 7,
2014) (“A technical name consisting of one word only.”). The term
monoseme came into common usage to describe technical medical terms at
the turn of the twentieth century. Scholars have also applied the term to
certain prominent trademarks or trade names. For example, David
Crystal offers MICROSOFT as an example of a monosemous term. DAVID
CRYSTAL, HOW LANGUAGE WORKS 191 (2005).
OWEN W. LINZMAYER, APPLE CONFIDENTIAL: THE REAL STORY OF APPLE
COMPUTER, INC. (1999); Stephen Wozniak, Homebrew and How the Apple
Came to Be, in DIGITAL DELI (Steve Ditlea ed., 1984); see also Trademark
Reg. No. 1,078,312 (Nov. 29, 1977) (APPLE for computers and computer
programs recorded on paper and tape).
For the sake of simplicity, I include within homonymy both homophones,
words that sound the same but have different written forms and different
meanings, and homographs, words with the same written form but
different pronunciations and meanings; see generally Ekaterina
Klepousniotou, The Processing of Lexical Ambiguity: Homonymy and
Polysemy in the Mental Lexicon, 81 BRAIN & LANGUAGE 205 (2001).
Keith Allan defines homonymy as “the relation between two or more
expressions which have the same form but different meanings.” 1 KEITH
ALLAN, LINGUISTIC MEANING 147 (1986). Grzega and Schöner identify
several reasons for such a change: speakers drop sounds at the end of
words, or certain sounds are abandoned from language over time, causing
previously distinguishable words to become indistinguishable. Grzega &
Schöner, supra note 109, at 32.
Bank as an institution derives from the Italian term for bench. Bank, n.3,
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15237 (last
visited Nov. 7, 2014); see also infra note 133 and accompanying text. The
meaning of bank as the side of a river, or other raised shelf of ground, on
the other hand, is of Scandinavian origin. Bank, n.1, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/15235 (last visited Nov. 7,
2014). The two terms collapsed into the same word, banke, in early
modern English. Id.
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suggests that readers and listeners process unrelated or
homonymous meanings as if they were completely different
words.131 In the trademark context, adopting an arbitrary mark
is not accidental. For example, Steve Jobs and Steve Wozniak
selected APPLE as a source signifier for the personal
computers they built. But the absence of a relationship
between the mark and the goods or services makes the
arbitrary trademark more clearly distinctive than trademarks
more intimately connected to the offered good or service.
Unlike the coining of monosemes, or homonymous shift,
some semantic shift creates a new meaning that is closely
related, or polysemous to existing meanings.132 Linguists posit
that polysemes are interrelated in such a way that the reader
or listener derives multiple meanings from a single or central
sense.133 Polysemous senses are etymologically related,
stemming from a common source. To take an earlier example in
a different direction, the word bank means a financial
institution, the building in which the financial institution is
housed, any number of institutions that store things (like a
blood bank), and a synonym for “to rely upon,” for example,
“you can bank on it.”134 All those meanings derived from the
Italian term for bench, which was “extended in Italian to mean,
alternately, ‘tradesman’s stall, counter, money changer’s table’”
and more.135
Polysemous shifts are of two regular types: metonymic (for
example, Green Beret, the distinctive headgear of the United
States Army Special Forces extended to a nickname for the

131

132

133

134
135

WILLIAM CROFT & D. ALAN CRUSE, COGNITIVE LINGUISTICS 112 (2004)
(suggesting that it is difficult, but not impossible, to simultaneously
construe an ambiguous word using two homonymous meanings);
Ekaterina Klepousniotou, Reconciling Linguistics and Psycholinguistics:
On the Psychological Reality of Linguistic Polysemy, in THE COGNITIVE
BASIS OF POLYSEMY: NEW SOURCES OF EVIDENCE FOR THEORIES OF WORD
MEANING 29 (Rakova et al. eds., 2007) [hereinafter Klepousniotou,
Reconciling]; Ekaterina Klepousniotou & Shari R. Baum, Disambiguating
the Ambiguity Advantage Effect in Word Recognition: An Advantage for
Polysemous but Not Homonymous Words, 20 J. NEUROLINGUISTICS 1, 4
(2007) [hereinafter Klepousniotou & Baum, Disambiguating] (explaining
that homonyms have mutually exclusive meanings, one of which must be
selected before further processing can occur).
Allan defines polysemy as “the property of an expression with more than
one meaning.” 1 ALLAN, supra note 129, at 147.
Klepousniotou & Baum, Disambiguating, supra note 131, at 4 (explaining
that polysemes have a single core meaning from which interrelated senses
are derived).
CROFT & CRUSE, supra note 131, at 109-110.
Bank, n.3, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry
/15237 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
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organization and its members),136 and metaphoric (for example,
lip for “part of the body around the mouth” extended to “edge of
a cup”).137 In both cases, the speaker perceives some similarity
between two concepts, and uses the word for the first concept to
refer to the second.
Descriptive and suggestive marks are both polysemous with
the goods or services identified. Descriptive marks are related
to the word or words from which they are drawn in a manner
that resembles metonymic polysemy. A descriptive mark builds
on a characteristic of the good or service offered, while a
metonymic shift is a change based on contiguity between
concepts.138 For example, a term like SEALTIGHT for fasteners
describes the qualities a fastener would likely have and is thus
descriptive in nature.
The creation of a suggestive mark mirrors metaphoric
polysemy. Suggestive marks operate in metaphoric relationship
to the words from which they are drawn,139 requiring “the
consumer to exercise his imagination to reach a conclusion as
to the nature of the . . . goods” offered under that mark.140 For
example, SKINVISIBLE for transparent bandages is a
portmanteau that conveys a characteristic of the product—
transparency—but in a way that hints at, rather than
expressly states, the connection.141

136

137
138

139

140

141

D. GARY MILLER, ENGLISH LEXICOGENESIS 111 (2014) (offering several
examples of metonymic polysemy, such as the use of redcoat for British
military officer and skirt for a woman).
Klepousniotou, Reconciling, supra note 131, at 27.
See TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 28. For instance, horn for
“animal horn” added the sense of horn for “musical instrument,” due to
the use of some animal horns as musical instruments or warning devices.
Andreas Blank, Co-Presence and Succession: A Cognitive Typology of
Metonymy, in METONYMY IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT 169, 182 (Klaus-Uwe
Panther & Günter Radden eds., 1999).
Metaphoric extensions are based on a specific analogous similarity
between concepts. GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra note 16, at 27.
For instance, broadcast originally meant to “scatter[ seed] abroad over the
whole surface, instead of . . . sow[ing] in drills or rows,” then to “scatter[
something] widely abroad,” and later came to mean “[d]isseminate[] by
means of radio or television.” Broadcast, v. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/23507 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
Synergistic Int’l, LLC v. Korman, 470 F.3d 162, 171 (4th Cir. 2006)
(quoting Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1528 (4th Cir.
1984); see also U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL
OF EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 1209.01(a) (2014) (“Suggestive marks . . .
when applied to the goods or services at issue, require imagination,
thought, or perception to reach a conclusion as to the nature of those
goods or services . . . . [But a] descriptive term . . . immediately tells
something about the goods or services.”).
Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson, 454 F.2d 1179, 1180

2015

Linguistic Justification for “Generic” Trademarks

139

As with the processing of different types of semantic
innovation, trademarks qualify for protection based on the
relationship between the mark and the offered good or service.
Fanciful, arbitrary, and suggestive marks are treated as
inherently distinctive, qualifying for trademark protection from
first use. While suggestive marks are classified as inherently
distinctive, some courts consider a suggestive mark to be
weaker than arbitrary or fanciful marks and thus entitled to
narrower protection from alleged infringement.142 A descriptive
mark is protectable only after source significance is
established.143
At a rough cut, the different treatment of fanciful,
arbitrary, suggestive, and descriptive marks is defensible in
light of how listeners and readers process confusing ambiguity.
It is easy for consumers to view a fanciful mark as a source
signifier because the lack of relationship between the mark and
any other word will lead the consumer to perceive the word as
a trademark. Likewise, the lack of connection between the
arbitrary mark and the good or service offered will be perceived
by consumers as distinct lexical entries, i.e., two clearly distinct
things that share superficial similarities in visual or audible
element. Likewise, suggestive and descriptive marks are
closely connected with the good or service sold. If trademark
protection turns on consumer perception, the mark owner
should be required to build up secondary meaning or
commercial strength before the law protects a descriptive or
suggestive term from trademark infringement.144

142

143

144

(C.C.P.A. 1972) (reversing decision of the TTAB which sustained an
opposition to the application to register SKINVISIBLE on ground of mere
descriptiveness under § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act).
Compare M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th
Cir. 2005) (concluding that suggestive marks, like descriptive marks, are
“conceptually weak”), with Pizzeria Uno Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522,
1527 (4th Cir. 1984) (concluding that suggestive marks are considered
“strong” as well as “presumptively valid”), Dreamwerks Prod. Grp., Inc. v.
SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1131 (9th Cir. 1998) (concluding that the
mark of the smaller junior user was inherently distinctive and thus
deserved “broad protection”), and Beebe, Multifactor, supra note 124, at
1637-38 (analyzing likelihood of confusion cases and reporting that courts
concluded a suggestive mark was strong in just under 59 percent of cases,
but concluded that an arbitrary mark was strong in over 68 percent of
cases, and that a fanciful mark was strong in every reported case).
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 380 (7th Cir. 1976)
(“Secondary meaning need only be shown if a mark . . . is found to be or is
conceded to be descriptive.”).
For a more complete consideration from a linguistic standpoint of whether
suggestive and descriptive marks should be treated differently, see
Linford, False Dichotomy, supra note 7.
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On the other hand, trademark incapacity is not defensible
in light of our best understanding of how people process
linguistic ambiguity and language change. While trademark
acquisition is a subset of the broader phenomenon of semantic
shift, the doctrine of trademark incapacity discounts
restriction, which may be the most common form of semantic
shift. The next Section explains the phenomenon of restriction
in more detail.
B.

Regularity of Restriction in Semantic Shift

Semantic shift occurs in regular patterns. This Section
considers two well-recognized patterns, restriction and
widening, and what they can teach us about consumer
perception and consumer confusion. Restriction is narrowing in
meaning from a broad category to a prototypical member of
that category.145 For example, queen once meant “wife” or
“woman,” but the meaning has narrowed to “king’s wife” or
“female sovereign.”146 Widening happens when the name of a
thing comes to represent the category to which the thing
belongs.147 For instance, the French arriver originally meant
“to reach the river bank,” but has broadened to mean “to reach
a destination.”148 Restriction and widening are both examples
of semantic change that occurs because of a focus by speakers
and listeners on a prototypical member of a group. A significant
amount of semantic shift is driven by the focus on a
prototypical example of a given category.149 Thus, some
scholars identify restriction and widening as the most
important processes of semantic change.150
Michel Bréal, one of the founders of semantic linguistics,
first posited that restriction is the most frequently occurring
regular semantic shift.151 Historical accounts support this

145

146
147
148
149
150

151

Restriction is also called narrowing or specification. GEERAERTS, LEXICAL
SEMANTICS, supra note 16, at 27.
Id.
Widening is also called generalization or broadening. Id.
Id.
Blank, supra note 99, at 62-63.
See MICHEL BRÉAL, SEMANTICS: STUDIES IN THE SCIENCE OF MEANING 189
(Cust trans., 1964) (“[T]he facts of restriction are of the most frequent
occurrence.”); GERT RONBERG, A WAY WITH WORDS: THE LANGUAGE OF
ENGLISH RENAISSANCE LITERATURE 32 (1992); see also Francisco Yus,
Relevance Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LINGUISTICS 679, 693
(Bernd Heine & Heiko Narrog eds., 2012) (arguing that the creation of
metaphors often involves “both broadening and narrowing of concepts”).
BRÉAL, supra note 150, at 106; see also MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 17879 (explaining that restriction is the most natural form of language
change, particularly when a loan word is introduced, and the old word
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theory. For example, the shift from Old English to Middle
English is replete with instances of semantic restriction and
loss of Old English vocabulary.152 Much of that restriction
occurred as new “loanwords” were introduced from other
languages, and the meanings of both old and new terms were
narrowed as they came into conflict. For instance, while the
Old English word goma once referred broadly to “jaw, palate,
and inside of the mouth,” the introduction of palate from the
Latin and jaw from an unidentified source coincides with a
restriction of goma, or gum, to refer only to the connective
tissue surrounding the teeth.153 Cultural and technological
change also explains some semantic shift, as words are lost due
to irrelevance. For example, no one walks around with a body
of retainers anymore, so a word like folgoÞ—the Old English
word for “a body of retainers” —has been rendered obsolete.154
Often, a term designating a whole category is narrowed or
restricted to a prototypical member of the category.155 For
example, meat once meant “food,” but has narrowed to “edible
flesh.”156 The shift of a generic term to a trademark—like the
shift from understanding hog to mean any large motorcycle to
specifically Harley Davidson motorcycles—is another example
of restriction.157
There are multiple examples through history of semantic
restriction from the whole category to a prototypical member.
For example, corn stems from the Latin word for grain. In a
given locale, the term will adopt a usual meaning
corresponding to the dominant crop in the region. Corn is thus
narrowed in the United States to mean maize, while in most of
England, corn refers to what U.S. consumers would call wheat,
and in northern England and Ireland, corn identifies what U.S.
residents call oats.158 Other examples include skyline

152

153
154
155
156
157
158

must “recoil” to stay relevant); ROBERT P. STOCKWELL & DONKA MINKOVA,
ENGLISH WORDS: HISTORY AND STRUCTURE 158 (2001) (arguing that
restriction is an unnatural change but conceding that restriction happens
“quite frequently” in some contexts).
C.M. MILLWARD & MARY HAYES, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
205 (3d ed. 2012) (“The type of semantic change easiest to find between
OE and ME (and during ME) is narrowing of meaning . . . . [M]any OE
words acquired narrower, more specific meanings in ME as a direct result
of loans from other languages.”).
Id.
Id. at 203.
BRÉAL, supra note 150, at 106.
LEONARD BLOOMFIELD, LANGUAGE 426 (1933).
See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
Corn, n.1, OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY at II.3.a, http://www.oed.com/view
/Entry/41586 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
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narrowing from any horizon to a horizon decorated by
skyscrapers;159 and wife narrowing from any woman of humble
rank or low employment to married woman or spouse.160 The
Old English steorfan, meaning “to die,” narrowed in Modern
English to starve, meaning “to die of hunger.”161 Art originally
had general meanings connected to “skill,” “technique,” or
“craft,” but is now primarily related to aesthetic skill in a fine
art.162 At the time the Constitution was drafted, science broadly
referred to knowledge or learning, but has narrowed today to
refer to the investigation of natural phenomena through
observation and experimentation.163 Accident has narrowed
from any unforeseen event to an unfortunate one.164 Fowl in
Old English referred to any bird, but narrowed to a
domesticated bird raised for food or a wild hunted for sport.165
The meaning of girl narrowed from “child or young person of
either sex” in Middle English to “female child” or “young
woman.”166
It is not unusual for two or more ambiguous meanings to
coexist for a time before one of the meanings is forced out.167
Restriction does not necessarily force old meanings out of the
lexicon entirely. But even when a meaning is not forced out,
semantic overload is resolved as words abandon potentially
conflicting meanings or are otherwise narrowed. For example,
since light (from Old English, meaning “bright,” “brilliant,” “or
“shining”) and light (from German, the antonym of heavy)
coexist in English, it is difficult to use a phrase like “light
materials” without resorting to a compound such as “light
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160
161
162

163

164

165
166
167

VICTORIA FROMKIN ET AL., AN INTRODUCTION TO LANGUAGE 361 (10th ed.
2013).
GEORGE YULE, THE STUDY OF LANGUAGE 233 (4th ed. 2010).
MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 177-78.
CRYSTAL, supra note 126, at 224-30; Alan L. Durham, “Useful Arts” in the
Information Age, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1419, 1425 (1999).
Durham, supra note 162, at 1425 (“A reference to Dr. Johnson’s definition
of ‘scientifick’ will show . . . that the natural science which the present
connotation of the word calls to mind was, in the days when the
Constitution was written, referred to as ‘natural philosophy.’”) (quoting
Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 39697 (1960)).
FRANCIS KATAMBA, ENGLISH WORDS: STRUCTURE, HISTORY, USAGE 175
(2004).
Id.
Hollmann, supra note 17, at 304.
See, e.g., TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 12; see also 2 JOHN LYONS,
SEMANTICS § 10.4, at 397 (explaining that the context in which an
ambiguous word is presented can be “such that all but one of the possible
interpretations are irrelevant or relatively improbable”).

2015

Linguistic Justification for “Generic” Trademarks

143

weight.”168 Likewise, sand in Old English meant both the strip
of land next to a body of water and the particulate matter
common to that land. When the German word shore was
borrowed to refer to the body of land, sand was narrowed to
mean only the granular particles.169 The semantic overload
created by the ambiguity resulted in the narrowing of both
terms.170
In addition, restriction increases the amount of information
conveyed by the restricted form of a word, compared to the
broader form. As the meaning restricts, the term can be applied
more precisely and requires less contextual processing.171 Thus,
a restricted term communicates more efficiently. Think back to
the restriction of hound from designating any dog to
designating a long-eared hunting dog.172 If I tell you that I’ve
lost my dog, you might ask me what type of dog he is before
trying to find him. When hound meant any dog, it did not
convey much information about the breed of dog in question.
However, when the meaning of hound was restricted to large
dogs used for hunting, the word conveyed more information to
the listener. Compare this to the way a child first learning
English may use a word like “dog” to represent any four-legged
mammal.173 The more general the word, the less information it
conveys.
Restriction has its opposite. A term designating the
prototypical member of a category may be widened or
generalized to represent the whole category.174 For example,
dog used to refer to specific large or strong breeds of
domesticated canines (and still does in Danish), but has since
been broadened to include any domesticated canine regardless
of size.175 Widening happens frequently, but less often than
restriction.176

TRAUGOTT & DASHER, supra note 2, at 12; see also Menner, Homonyms,
supra note 110, at 241-42.
169 C.M. MILLWARD & MARY HAYES, A BIOGRAPHY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
205 (3d ed. 2012).
170 As discussed in another article, this same effect can arise in cases where
confusing use is tolerated in the trademark context. See Jake Linford,
Trademark Infringement as Semantic Shift (2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author).
171 MCMAHON, supra note 26, at 178 (“[A] restricted form is applicable to
fewer situations but tells us more about each one.”).
172 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
173 ALLAN, supra note 129, at 103.
174 BRÉAL, supra note 150, at 115-21; GEERAERTS, LEXICAL SEMANTICS, supra
note 16, at 26-27.
175 Hollmann, supra note 17, at 304.
176 See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
168
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Semantic shift is a natural phenomenon, but in the
trademark context, it is also a phenomenon with legal
consequences. When a trademarked term is widened to
represent the product category as a whole, the mark owner can
lose protection in the mark.177 For example, KLEENEX, the
“proprietary name of an absorbent disposable cleansing paper
tissue,”178 has ostensibly broadened over time to add a second
polysemous meaning as a designation for “any disposable
cleansing paper tissue, regardless of brand.”179 Likewise, the
CELLOPHANE mark lost source significance when a court
concluded the mark had primarily become a generic
designation for a transparent sheet of semi-viscous paper ideal
for preserving food.180 Consumers who continue to rely on the
source significance of a mark that undergoes generislide will be
confused,181 but consumers who have adopted the broader
meaning might welcome cheaper competition by a free-riding
new entrant who uses the former trademark to identify
competing products or services.182
Likewise, if a generic term acquires source-significance and
is recognized as a trademark, as this Article supports,183
competitors who plan to use the term to designate their own
products will find a mark owner backed with legal authority to
secure injunctive relief and/or damages against the
competitor’s confusing use. Consumer and competitor
investment in the restricted generic term will be the inverse of
interest in the widened trademark. Consumers who would not
be confused by the competition may pay more for the products

177

178

179

180

181

182

183

See infra notes 201-207 and accompanying text; see also Jake Linford,
Generislide and Trademark’s Other Slippery Slopes (2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Linford, Generislide].
Kleenex, n., OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, http://www.oed.com/view/Entry
/103818 (last visited Nov. 7, 2014).
ROBERT J. JEFFERS & ILSE LEHISTE, PRINCIPLES AND METHODS FOR
HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS 129 (1979); see also Heymann, supra note 1.
Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 6 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y.
1934).
Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, A Search-Costs Theory of Limiting
Doctrines in Trademark Law, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1223, 1241 (2007)
(noting that doctrines like abandonment “present ‘hard cases’ precisely
because there are search cost rationales on both sides of the argument,”
and recognizing that, from an economically grounded “search costs
perspective, the automatic preference given to one group of consumers
over another can be troubling”) [hereinafter Dogan & Lemley, SearchCosts Theory].
See generally Eric Goldman, Deregulating Relevancy in Internet
Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J. 507 (2005); Michael Grynberg, Trademark
Litigation as Consumer Conflict, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 60 (2008).
See infra Part III.B.
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they desire because trademark protection can increase costs for
competitors, but consumers who have adopted the narrowed
meaning will have lower search costs to find the products they
desire.
As discussed in Part I.B, the doctrine of trademark
incapacity currently denies legal significance to semantic
restriction when the term that acquires secondary meaning
was once a generic product designation. The doctrine is out of
step with the best current understanding of how semantic shift
occurs and how language users manage confusing ambiguity.
Part III refutes the standard justifications for trademark
incapacity, then proposes an alternative doctrinal approach to
bring trademark law in line with our best evidence about how
consumers process restriction.
III.

TRADEMARK (IN)CAPACITY AND THE MYTH OF SHIFTRESISTANT TERMS

If trademark law aims to optimize consumer search costs
and minimize consumer confusion, then the law should reflect
how consumers will likely process the semantic change that
occurs when trademark meaning is created. The treatment of
generic marks under the doctrine of trademark incapacity is at
cross-purposes with these aims. The process by which a generic
trademark gains source significance is a form of restriction,
and ignoring restriction—and the consumer perception of
source significance that comes with it—may well increase error
in trademark litigation. Competition justifications for
trademark incapacity likewise fall short precisely because they
purport to divorce competition concerns from consumer
confusion, even though consumer confusion is the sine qua non
of trademark infringement.
Because trademark law should accurately reflect consumer
concerns and reduce consumer search costs, we should embrace
a doctrine that better reflects regular semantic shift.
Trademark law should thus abandon the incapacity doctrine.
This Article argues instead for applying a primary significance
standard for the acquisition of trademark protection. Under the
primary significance standard, a term for which the primary
meaning is a source-signifying trademark should receive
federal trademark protection, regardless of whether the term
was once a generic designation.
A.

Recognizing Trademark’s Capacities

Parts I.B and I.C described the current function of the
trademark incapacity doctrine as it currently operates, and
outlined several proposed justifications for the doctrine. This
Section now turns to the argument, grounded in the semantic
shift literature, for why the law should abandon the trademark
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incapacity doctrine in favor of recognizing the capacity of any
term to serve as a trademark where the appropriate semantic
shift has in fact occurred.
First, it is important to separate questions of trademark
incapacity from the general inquiry that a fact finder must
make into whether a mark is source-signifying. If a term is
currently generic, the term does not merit trademark protection
because there is insufficient source significance and therefore
no trademark right to enforce. Trademark incapacity, however,
adds another layer to the inquiry by requiring the fact finder to
determine whether the term was ever a generic designation for
the product category, often ignoring current source
significance. Thus, in Grottanelli, the court granted greater
weight to a dictionary definition stating that hog was once used
to designate any big motorcycle, than to evidence that 98
percent of surveyed consumers associated the term hog with
Harley Davidson motorcycles.184
What harm requires this linguistic grave-digging? This
second level of inquiry requires justification above and beyond
the obvious harm of granting trademark protection to a term
the majority of consumers see as a generic product designation.
If there is no separate justification, then we should simply
handle the analysis as we do for descriptive marks, and look for
secondary meaning as measured by consumer perception,
claimant’s efforts, and other relevant proxies. Part III.A.1
describes and refutes an error-cost justification for trademark
incapacity. Part III.A.2 then considers and rebuts justifications
for trademark incapacity grounded in competition policy.
1.

Refuting the Error-cost Justification for
Trademark Incapacity

Some courts and scholars argue that trademark incapacity
is justified because it reduces administrative and error costs,185
but ignoring semantic restriction may well increase error and
consumer confusion. Trademark law has, to date, artificially
hampered recognition of semantic restriction when it occurs.
This limitation may impose real costs on consumers, costs that
trademark law ostensibly seeks to alleviate.
Enforcement costs come in two general varieties:
administrative costs—the cost of getting an answer, and error
costs—the costs imposed on litigants and society if a court

184

185

Harley Davidson, Inc. v. Grottanelli, 164 F.3d 806 (2d Cir. 1999); see
supra note 48-49 and accompanying text.
See generally Bone, Enforcement Costs, supra note 70.
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reaches the wrong result.186 In the trademark incapacity
context, both the administrative and error cost analyses turn in
part on the relative frequency with which we should expect
restricting shifts.187 Courts and scholars articulating the
doctrine of trademark incapacity often posit that generic terms
generally do not acquire source-signifying meaning,188 treating
the few cases where courts have recognized the shift, like
Singer or Goodyear, as outliers.189 Consider again the
COMPUTER trademark hypothetical discussed in Part I.
Trademark rights in COMPUTER for an information
processing device appear problematic because we are in the
midst of an era where it seems that nearly everyone in the
United States owns or has access to a computer. If the majority
of trademark incapacity cases were like this hypothetical case,
one might conclude that a shift in meaning from a generic
product designation to source signifier is so unlikely that we
should avoid the administrative cost of finding out whether it
ever happens. Trademark incapacity’s static view of language
seems sensible at that extreme end of the scale.
But if, as Part II describes, meaning in language is subject
to persistent, if not continual change,190 one might be puzzled
by how trademark law handles generic terms. In particular,
the doctrine of trademark incapacity may generate error
because it turns on a misapprehension about how frequently
semantic restriction occurs. A shift from a generic product
designation to a source-signifying trademark is a prototypical
186

187
188

189
190

See id. at 2123 (“In general, there are two types of enforcement cost:
administrative (or process) costs and error costs.”).
Id.
See, e.g., In re Hotels.com, L.P., 573 F.3d 1300, 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2009)
(“[G]eneric terms by definition are incapable of indicating source.”); In re
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner, & Smith, Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 1569 (Fed.
Cir. 1987) (“Generic terms, by definition incapable of indicating source,
are the antithesis of trademarks, and can never attain trademark
status.”). Occasionally, courts have phrased the trademark incapacity
doctrine in a manner that might leave room for a source-significanceacquiring semantic shift. See, e.g., H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of
Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (“A generic term is the
common descriptive name of a class of goods or services, and, while it
remains such common descriptive name, it can never be registered as a
trademark because such a term is ‘merely descriptive’ within the meaning
of § 2(e)(1) of the Lanham Act and is incapable of acquiring de jure
distinctiveness under § 2(f) of the Lanham Act.”) (emphasis added)
(citations omitted).
See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
See Anne Curzan, What Makes a Word Real?, TED (Mar. 2014), http://www
.ted.com/talks/anne_curzan_what_makes_a_word_real (describing the speak
-er’s practice of delaying the start of her college English class each day
until students share two new words).
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example of restrictive change, and restriction is, by some
accounts, the most common form of semantic shift.191 Even if
restriction were no more common than any other form of
semantic shift,192 there is no reason from a linguistic
standpoint to think a generic term cannot change to primarily
designate a single source for a good, or that consumers cannot
process the restriction. The current trademark regime may
introduce error by pretending that restriction cannot happen or
happens so rarely that it should be ignored. In addition, the
doctrine
encourages
courts
to
engage
in
faulty
compartmentalization of compound marks (as with
HOTELS.COM,
CHOCOLATE
FUDGE
SODA
or
TURBODIESEL).193 The trademark incapacity doctrine is thus
an unfortunate static outlier in an otherwise dynamic
trademark system.
Trademark incapacity might nevertheless be justified if the
harm from a false positive (the shift has not occurred, but the
court concludes the mark can be protected) is greater than the
harm from a false negative (the shift has occurred, but the
court concludes the mark cannot be protected).194 Denying
protection under the doctrine may thus turn on a perceived
imbalance in error costs. Some have suggested that allowing a
generic term to acquire source significance will increase
consumer search costs.195 For example, if one seller is granted
trademark rights in COMPUTER for personal information
processing devices, other sellers might struggle to find another
word that adequately identifies competing products to
consumers. Consumers might find only one type of computer
and miss a product they would prefer to buy because the
trademark rights of the company selling computers under the
COMPUTER trademark prohibits competitors from using the
term “computer” to sell them.
This apprehension drove the Supreme Court’s analysis in
Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co.196 There, the Court
contemplated the competitive impact of granting National
Biscuit an exclusive right to use the term “Shredded Wheat”

191
192
193
194

195
196

See supra notes 151-154 and accompanying text.
See STOCKWELL & MINKOVA, supra note 151, at 158.
See supra notes 50-52, 55-57, and accompanying text.
Cf. Joseph Miller, Error Costs & IP Law, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 175
(describing how in close cases, courts should put a thumb on the scale
against interpreting intellectual property provisions broadly because the
cost of a false positive is higher than the cost of a false negative).
See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
305 U.S. 111 (1938). I will return to Kellogg in the discussion of
functionality and trademark incapacity in Part III.A.2(3).
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when that was the term by which consumers had come to
identify the product sold by both parties.197 Denying Kellogg
the right to refer to the product by name would have limited its
ability to communicate with interested consumers. This could
result in an increased price for the “official” shredded wheat
product line as competitors are required to find a different, but
sufficiently similar name by which to identify their competing
products.
While courts have posited that protecting generic terms
increases consumer search costs because it prevents
competitors from providing consumers with information they
need about the products offered,198 that is the case only so long
as the term is currently perceived by a critical mass of
consumers as generic. In a counterfactual world where the
majority of consumers see shredded wheat not as a product
category but instead as a trademark, the consumer search cost
rationale does not support trademark incapacity.199 The
purported imposition on consumers has little to do with
whether the term was once generic or merely descriptive.200
The consumer search cost problem in the trademark
incapacity context can be better understood by considering how
a trademark loses protection. A mark can lose protection if it
ceases to serve as a source signifier.201 Trademark law applies
a primary significance or “majority wins” standard to
determine when a shift in consumer perception changes a
protectable source signifier into an unprotectable product
designation.202 Courts do not ask whether every consumer sees

197
198

199

200

201
202

Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118.
See, e.g., Boston Duck Tours, LP v. Super Duck Tours, LLC, 531 F.3d 1, 14
(1st Cir. 2008) (“[I]n accord with the primary justifications for protecting
trademarks—to aid competition and lower consumers’ search costs—the
law does not grant any party exclusive rights to use generic terms as
trademarks.”).
Scholars engaging in economic analyses of trademark law argue the
trademark incapacity doctrine is likely inefficient. See, e.g., Bone,
Enforcement Costs, supra note 70, at 2124; Desai & Rierson, supra note
64, at 1832-33. But see Lisa P. Ramsey, Descriptive Trademarks and the
First Amendment, 70 TENN. L. REV. 1095 (2003) (arguing on First
Amendment grounds that even descriptive marks do not merit trademark
protection).
Cf. Goldman, supra note 182 (describing multiple constituency problems
in the internet search context); Grynberg, supra note 182 (arguing that
defendants in trademark litigation may serve as proxies for consumers
who are not confused by, and may prefer the information conveyed by, the
allegedly confusing use).
15 U.S.C. § 1127(2) (L.A. § 45).
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (L.A. § 45) (“A mark shall be deemed ‘abandoned’ . . .
[w]hen any course of conduct of the owner, including acts of omission as
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the mark as generic. Rather, courts considering a claim of ex
post genericness look for evidence that a majority of the
relevant consumer base now uses the mark as a generic
product designation. Once a majority of consumers see the
mark as generic, it no longer qualifies for trademark
protection.203 Many marks have lost trademark protection in
the United States, including aspirin, cellophane, and
escalator.204
The slide out of protection (which elsewhere I have called
“generislide”)205 is justified on the ground that the majority of
consumers see the term primarily as a product designator, even
though some consumers will find it more difficult to locate the
product they want if, for example, they think of aspirin as a
designation for a pain reliever from a particular source. Stacy
Dogan and Mark Lemley have noted the law is willing to
“sacrifice” the interests of consumers who still see a mark as
source-signifying “as soon as a critical mass of consumers
treats the term as generic,”206 because “the harm to consumers
who associate the term with the entire class of goods outweighs
the harm to the diminishing number who view it only as a
mark.”207 Under a search-cost rationale, the mark should fall
into genericness so that competitors can sell their own “aspirin”
under another mark.
The same search-cost rationale should shape the outcome
when a majority of consumers see a formerly or potentially
generic term primarily as a source-signifying trademark.

203

204

205
206
207

well as commission, causes the mark to become the generic name for the
goods or services on or in connection with which it is used or otherwise to
lose its significance as a mark.”); see also Big Island Candies, Inc. v. The
Cookie Corner, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1251 (D. Haw. 2003) (“[F]or a
genericness survey, majority usage controls.”) (internal citations omitted).
See infra notes 271-274 and accompanying text. The Xerox Corporation
has been fighting this trend for decades. See, e.g., Linford, Generislide,
supra note 177 (describing Xerox’s efforts).
See Haughton Elevator Co. v. Seeberger, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 80 (Apr. 3,
1950); Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Products Co., 6 F. Supp. 859
(E.D.N.Y. 1934); Bayer Co. v. United Drug Co. 272 F. 505, 512 (S.D.N.Y.
1921) (holding that aspirin had become a generic mark to consumers, but
not pharmacists, who were familiar with the chemical name
acetylsalicylic acid).
See Linford, Generislide, supra note 177 .
Dogan & Lemley, Consumer Search Costs, supra note 82, at 794.
Dogan & Lemley, Search-Costs Theory, supra note 181, at 1242 (“[T]he
genericness doctrine can impose substantial search costs on consumers,
particularly when a once-famous mark such as ‘aspirin’ or ‘thermos’
becomes generic.”). Courts do not always leave those confused consumers
and the producers who sell to them without remedy. See infra notes 286301 and accompanying text.
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Under the trademark incapacity doctrine, however, the use of a
term as a nominative product designator always trumps
adjectival trademark use, even if a majority of the public sees
the term primarily as a trademark. It may nevertheless be the
case that the junior user stands as a proxy for consumers who
benefit from potentially confusing speech, or who easily process
confusing ambiguity. Michael Grynberg, for example, has
argued that courts should expressly recognize that the
defendant in a trademark lawsuit can serve as a proxy for
consumers who are not confused by and therefore may benefit
from the junior user’s entry. Such a focus, from Grynberg’s
perspective,
would
minimize
problematic
trademark
expansion,208 and might be best applied when it is unclear how
many consumers can tolerate confusion and how many suffer
from it. But if there is clear evidence about the relative size of
the constituencies, then primary significance is the proper test
for whether an ex ante generic term qualifies for trademark
protection.
If trademark law properly focuses on minimizing search
costs for the majority of consumers,209 the trademark
incapacity doctrine should give us pause. Applying the doctrine
of trademark incapacity can increase consumer search costs. As
scholars have recognized in the generislide context, favoring
the perception of a dwindling minority of consumers that a
word is a trademark harms the majority who see a former
mark as a generic product identifier. If trademark law is to
reduce consumer search costs, the law should apply the same
primary significance standard to determine whether a shift in
consumer perception has changed a product designation into a
protectable source signifier.
2.

Rebutting the Competition Justification
for Trademark Incapacity

If avoidance of error costs does not explain trademark
incapacity, perhaps courts are instead justified in ignoring
restrictive shift in the trademark space on normative grounds.
These normative justifications are roughly grouped together as
aspects of competition policy and fall into three basic

208

209

See Grynberg, supra note 182. Eric Goldman has made a similar
argument in the internet search context, positing that at least some
consumers benefit when a search for information about one vendor
presents information about competing vendors (for example, presenting
results for Adidas shoes when a searcher types “Nike”). See Goldman,
supra note 182, at 525.
See, e.g., Mark Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1690-91 (1999).
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categories. First, courts frequently observe that allowing a
claimant to “convert common descriptive names, which belong
to the public, to their own exclusive use”210 could provide the
claimant with something approaching monopoly power. This
language depletion argument presumes stasis in language
change. But as the semantic shift literature makes clear, stasis
is not a feature of living languages, and concerns about
language depletion are likely overstated. Second, some courts
and scholars ground competition policy in a preference for
disruption or second entrants, but doing so privileges language
change benefiting some parties over others. Finally, some
courts and scholars have mistakenly grouped trademark
incapacity cases with functionality cases, which consider
whether a product feature (like springs holding up a
construction sign) qualify for protection as source-signifying
trade dress. But lumping generic terms in with product
features misreads early case law. In addition, unlike generic
terms, product features are relatively static. Indeed, as Romeo
Montague recognized in Shakespeare’s play, the name of a
thing is chimerical, while its features can be essential.211
(1)

Language Depletion and Monopoly
Power

Competition analysis is sometimes couched in terms of
language depletion.212 The language depletion argument posits
that protecting a previously generic term as a trademark
conveys something akin to monopoly power.213 At the extreme,

210

211

212

213

Weiss Noodle Co. v. Golden Cracknel & Specialty Co., 290 F.2d 845, 848
(1961).
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO & JULIET, act 2, sc. 2, in THE OXFORD
SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS OF WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE (W.J. Craig
ed., 1914) (1597) (“What’s in a name? that which we call a rose / By any
other name would smell as sweet.”).
Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Nationalizing Trademarks: A New International
Trademark Jurisprudence?, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 742-43 (2004)
(describing how trademark incapacity prevents the removal of words from
language through trademark propertization of generic terms); see also
Ann Bartow, The True Colors of Trademark Law: Greenlighting a Red
Tide of Anti Competition Blues, 97 KY. L.J. 263, 281 (2009) (“Providing an
incentive for companies to coin fanciful trademarks makes a certain kind
of sense if one is concerned about language depletion.”); Alexandra J.
Roberts, How to Do Things with Word Marks: A Speech-Act Theory of
Distinctiveness, 65 ALA. L. REV. 1035, 1055 (2014) (“If the PTO and courts
overprotect descriptive marks by allowing their registration and
enforcement without secondary meaning, they risk depleting the language
available to competitors and chilling speech by granting a property right
in a term that serves no trademark function.”).
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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the argument is likely correct at least some of the time. If we
all use the word “computer” to refer to our personal information
processing devices, sellers will likely need to use the word
“computer” to sell competing devices to us. If one seller is
allowed to secure trademark rights in COMPUTER as a mark,
other sellers may not be able to tell consumers about their
offerings without exposing themselves to legal liability.
In a static lexicon, allowing a trademark owner to secure
rights in a generic term would be problematic precisely because
it is impossible to imagine other generic designations arising in
a language that does not change. Trademark incapacity might
thus prevent the removal of words from common language.
However, in the absence of lexical stasis, the language
depletion rationale is significantly weaker.214 Consider this
modification of the aforementioned COMPUTER hypothetical.
One of the first “computers” was imagined by Charles Babbage,
who called his conceptual device an “analytical engine.”215 If
you were to offer a new line of computing devices under the
mark ANALYTICAL ENGINE, the term would be unfamiliar to
most modern consumers. But the etymology would be
problematic. The term would have a history, known to those
familiar with Babbage’s work. If you tried to enforce your
rights against me when I sell computers under a mark similar
or identical to your ANALYTICAL ENGINE mark, a court may
reject your claim in accordance with the trademark incapacity
doctrine solely because the first computer imagined was known
as an analytical engine. Thus, regardless of any evidence of
source significance in the eyes of consumers, your claim against
me would fail.216

214

215

216

The depletion or word scarcity justification has more traction in the color
depletion context, although the Supreme Court rejected a strong form of
the color depletion rationale in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobsen Products Co., Inc.
See 514 U.S. 159 (1995); supra note 76. Despite innovations in the color
naming department—for example, Farrow & Ball offers paint in such
obfuscatory varieties as babouche, pelt, and brinjal—we tend to think of
colors as coming in three primary and three tertiary shades. In fact, many
consumers cannot discern subtle differences in shade. The author, for
example, scored a 31 on an online color-acuity test, suggesting a less than
perfect ability to distinguish between similar shades. Colors can be, and
are frequently renamed, but for many consumers, eggplant is just purple.
The underlying color perceived does not change.
See, e.g., ALEXANDER JOHN ANDERSON, FOUNDATIONS OF COMPUTER
TECHNOLOGY 397 (1994).
Rejecting your hypothetical claim would also be problematic for
consumers who look to the mark ANALYTICAL ENGINE as a source for
your computers and who would be confused by my use of the same term
for similar products. See supra notes 201-209 and accompanying text.
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Fears of language depletion are in fact likely overstated.
For example, champagne was seen as a generic designation for
sparkling wine until the term was retaken as a Geographic
Indication within the European Union for sparkling wine
produced in the Champagne district of France.217 Spanish
producers of sparkling wine were forced to find a new identifier
for their product, and chose cava.218 The language depletion
rationale would lead one to expect that Spanish producers of
sparkling wine would be crippled by the inability to use
champagne. That does not appear to be the case. Sales of
Spanish cava did not drop after the rechristening, either in
Spain or the rest of Europe.219 In fact, one news outlet reported
that as of 2002, Spain sold “more of its celebratory wine under
the name of ‘cava’ than all the champagne from
Champagne.”220 There is some indication, however, that U.S.
consumers see cava as a cheap option compared to “authentic”
champagne.221 This suggests cava may be an imperfect
replacement for champagne. Cava producers may well invite
some perception problems because they set an aggressively low
price for cava.222 On the other hand, that perception may have
driven consumers to cava during financial downturns, allowing
cava to successfully compete as a low-cost entrant.223
Furthermore, rejecting semantic shift based on the history
of the word is a fallacy common to linguists and lexicographers.
On occasion, new meanings are rejected based on the fallacy
known as “argument from etymology.”224 An argument from

217

218

219

220

221

222

223

224

See Justin Hughes, Champagne, Feta, and Bourbon: The Spirited Debate
About Geographical Indications, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 321-23 (2006).
Id. at 369. Cava is Spanish for “caves,” where wine was preserved or aged
in the 1800s in the Catalonian region of Spain.
L‘Espagne Effervescente en France, VINS MAG., Winter 2002, at 16
(describing a growing success in northern France of sales of cava).
French Wrath Produces Bitter Whine, WASH. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2002, http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/nov/29/20021129-102555-4226r.
Lettie Teague, Cava Seeks to Make a New Name for Itself, WALL ST. J.,
July 4, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324183204
578563500481816138 (describing a tasting where the tasters expressed
unwillingness to pay $35 per bottle “for a Cava!” but might consider
paying that price for Champagne).
Victoria Moore, Cava: Why It’s Time to Stop Laughing at this Spanish
Sparkler, THE TELEGRAPH, May 31, 2013, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/food
anddrink/wine/10089672/Cava-why-its-time-to-stop-laughing-at-this-Span
ish-sparkler.html.
See, e.g., Nick Squires, Prosecco and Cava Have Edge on Champagne in
Sparkling Wine Market, THE TELEGRAPH, Dec. 31, 2009, http://www.tele
graph.co.uk/foodanddrink/wine/6914021/Prosecco-and-cava-have-edge-onchampagne-in-sparkling-wine-market.html.
See, e.g., GEOFFREY HUGHES, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH WORDS 27 (2000).
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etymology refutes a semantic shift, or the growth of a new
meaning, based on the perceived conflict between the new
meaning and earlier meanings. As C.S. Lewis once trenchantly
observed, however, resistance to language change often springs
up precisely because a vocal minority is uncomfortable with
how established words have taken on new meanings.225
(2)

Competition
Policy
and
Preference for Disruption

the

Trademark incapacity might instead be normatively
grounded in a different sort of competition analysis, based on a
perceived right of competitors that trumps both the right of a
putative mark owner and the understanding of consumers.226
We might call it a preference for disruption, an assumption
that any communication cross-cutting a dominant market
player is valuable in and of itself. This disruption rationale is
not entirely inconsistent with the marketplace of ideas

225

226

C.S. LEWIS, STUDIES IN WORDS 18 (2d ed. 1967) (“Statements that honour,
or freedom, or humour, or wealth ‘do not mean’ this or that are proof that
it was beginning to mean, or even had long meant, precisely this or that.
We tell our pupils that deprecate does not mean depreciate or that
immorality does not mean simply lechery because these words are
beginning to mean just those things. We are in fact resisting the growth of
a new sense.”) (emphasis in original).
See supra notes 75-82 and accompanying text. Rebecca Tushnet has
argued that the point of the functionality and de facto secondary meaning
doctrines is to encourage competition “by preventing a single producer
from obtaining rights in a phrase that is necessarily generic even if
consumers associate the phrase with the market leader—as with AOL’s
use of ‘You’ve Got Mail.’” Rebecca Tushnet, Why the Customer Isn’t Always
Right: Producer-Based Limits on Rights Accretion in Trademark, 116
YALE L.J. (THE POCKET PART) 352, 353 (2007) [hereinafter Tushnet,
Producer-Based Limits]. Tushnet might also embrace trademark
incapacity for the same reason she criticizes the dilution doctrine: “[A]
doctrine that favors meanings approved by established producers above
meanings offered by challengers . . . is anticompetitive.” Rebecca Tushnet,
Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86
TEX. L. REV. 507, 561 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, Sixty Milliseconds]; cf.
Irina D. Mantra, Bearing Down on Trademark Bullies, 22 FORDHAM
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 853, 853-54 (2012) (“[T]rademark
bullying has become a persistent problem . . . achieving anti-competitive
results.”). In Abercrombie, for example, the court identified a competitor’s
“right to call an article by its name.” Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting
World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); cf. Stephanie M. Greene, Sorting
Out “Fair Use” and “Likelihood of Confusion” in Trademark Law, 43 AM.
BUS. L.J. 43, 70-71 (2006) (arguing that allowing monopoly of a descriptive
term creates a barrier to entry because a potential competitor cannot use
the descriptive term and therefore must expend more effort to
communicate with and attract consumers). But see Linford, Adverse
Possessor, supra note 29, at 721-26 (responding to critiques of protection
of descriptive terms from a productive use framework).
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rationale for the First Amendment, which posits that the more
speech we receive (collectively), the more likely that truth will
win out.227 But the current incapacity doctrine defaults to an
assumption that the harm from recognizing trademark rights
to consumers and producers who use the term as a product
designation is so great that it must trump any benefit to
consumers who have come to see the mark as source-signifying,
or to the producer who has invested resources in creating
source significance. Thus, the ex ante bar against protecting a
trademark derived from a generic designation is packaged as
competition policy, but nonetheless grounded in the
assumption that some competitors, and some consumers, merit
protection over others.
A doctrine favoring the junior user in the trademark
incapacity context may do so because of a general distrust of
trademark owners and the “black arts” of marketing. Recent
trends include neuromarketing, which purports to make
advertisement more effective by targeting subconscious rather
than conscious responses.228 If marketers hold some power to
influence consumer perception at a subconscious level, perhaps
some courts properly distrust any evidence of shift in consumer
perception.229 Unfortunately, discounting all evidence of
consumer perception would effectively unravel the secondary
meaning inquiry entirely and leave us with nothing but
arguments from etymology. Even if we presume that marketers
engage in emotional rather than practical appeals, consumers
might still prefer to purchase products to which they feel an
emotional connection.230 It is also not clear why we should
assume marketing tricks are employed exclusively by the
senior user, and not the junior user. Assessing the persuasion

See, e.g., Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (“It is the
purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace
of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance
monopolization of that market . . . .”).
228 See, e.g., Natasha Singer, Making Ads that Whisper to the Brain, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/business/14str
eam.html.
229 But see Levy, supra note 88, at 1213 (“While corporations with large
marketing budgets undoubtedly have a great deal of power as language
users, it is presumptuous to assume that a single corporation, even with a
large marketing budget, has the ability to cause the majority of
consuming America to forget that the mark is also a common name. It
stands to reason that other forces are likely in play.”).
230 Bone, Goodwill, supra note 120, at 602-03 (summarizing Phillip Nelson’s
argument that critics lack a normative basis for distinguishing between
good (properly adopted) and bad (advertising induced) preferences) (citing
Philip Nelson, The Economic Consequences of Advertising, 48 J. BUS. 213,
213 (1975)).
227
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sophistication of consumers231 is a problem that applies to each
interaction between a consumer and a seller, whether that
seller is the first entrant or the most recent entrant.
Finally, every semantic innovation is cabined by public
acceptance or the lack thereof.232 For example, MTV used an
advertising campaign in New York City in a failed attempt to
insert new terms into the language, like round as a synonym of
cool. If the new terms were adopted, the changes did not last,
leading at least one scholar to conclude, “You cannot sell a
language.”233
(3)

Functionality
Incapacity

and

Trademark

A third way to articulate the justification for trademark
incapacity is to view it as part of a broader functionality
doctrine.234 The Supreme Court’s functionality jurisprudence
has been less than clear,235 and the Lanham Act fails to define
the term. But it may only slightly oversimplify to say the
functionality doctrine prevents an incumbent producer from
barring new entrants from selling a product with a given
feature, even if the product feature is clearly sourcesignifying,236 so long as the feature is also one that a competitor
needs to use in order to offer a competing product.237 For

See Beebe, Search and Persuasion, supra note 27 at 2025.
See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text. See also Hollmann, supra
note 17, at 535 (describing a nonce-formation, a failed attempt to coin a
new word).
233 SETH LERNER, INVENTING ENGLISH 259 (2007).
234 See supra note 78 and accompanying text; see also Mark P. McKenna &
Katherine J. Strandberg, Progress and Competition in Design, 17 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 1, 5 (2013) (“[T]rademark law subordinates its static
competition goals to the patent and copyright systems’ judgments about
how to encourage inventive and creative progress and promote dynamic
competition.”).
235 See generally Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Story of Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co.: Breakfast with Brandeis, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY STORIES
220 (Jane C. Ginsburg & Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss eds., 2005)
[hereinafter Dinwoodie, Story of Kellogg].
236 See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Brothers, Inc., 529 U.S. 205,
213 (2000) (“Consumers should not be deprived of the benefits of
competition with regard to the utilitarian and esthetic purposes that
product design ordinarily serves by a rule of law that facilitates plausible
threats of suit against new entrants based upon alleged inherent
distinctiveness.”); Bone, Enforcement Costs, supra note 70, at 2180 (“The
goal of the functionality doctrine is to strike a balance between limiting
the acquisition of market power and reducing information-related
consumer harms.”).
237 There is some disagreement on whether functionality protects a right to
compete or a right to copy. Compare Robert G. Bone, Trademark
231
232
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example, if a product feature like a dual spring design on a
traffic sign is considered an essential feature of the product,238
then a putative mark owner cannot secure trade dress
protection—protection for packaging and designs, rather than
words or symbols—whether or not consumers perceive the
feature as source-signifying.239
On the surface, the functionality inquiry is similar to the
trademark incapacity inquiry. But trademark incapacity does
not fall within the umbrella of functionality for two
interconnected reasons. First, the connection between
functionality and trademark incapacity is due in part to a
misreading of the Supreme Court’s decision in Kellogg Co. v.
National Biscuit Co.240 The decision in Kellogg, which has an
important functionality aspect,241 is also mistakenly treated as
a progenitor of trademark incapacity.242 In Kellogg, the Court
denied relief to National Biscuit, which sought to prevent
Kellogg from selling a competing breakfast cereal in the same

238
239
240
241

242

Functionality Revisited and Revised, at 21-22 (Univ. Tex. Law Sch., Law
and Econ. Research Paper No. e554, 2014), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2433179 (noting the shift in functionality
doctrine from protecting a right to copy to protecting the right to compete),
and Dinwoodie, Story of Kellogg, supra note 235, at 246-47 (arguing that
the Court has not been clear on whether patented product features are
functional because the quid pro quo of patent protection requires those
features to be thrust into the public domain, creating a right to copy, or
because copying the features is necessary to sell the product and thus
necessary to maintain a competitive infrastructure) with McKenna &
Strandberg, supra note 234, at 29 (arguing that the right to copy
unpatented features is the basis of the functionality doctrine because it
provides the basis for free competition), and Mark P. McKenna,
(Dys)functionality, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 823, 836-39 (2011) (suggesting that
courts considering the functionality doctrine, at least from a patent
perspective, have focused on the right of competitors to “share in the
benefit of consumer desire for objects in a particular form” by copying that
form, rather than the right to compete generally).
See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001).
See supra notes 236-237 and accompanying text.
Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
Id. at 122 (holding that defendant was entitled to make the biscuits at
issue in a “pillow-shape,” because the shape “is functional” and “the cost of
the biscuit would be increased and its high quality lessened if some other
form were substituted for the pillow-shape”).
See, e.g., A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291, 297 (3d Cir. 1986);
Graeme W. Austin, Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 827, 880 n.229 (2004) (“The leading case on de facto
secondary meaning is the Supreme Court’s decision in Kellogg . . . which
held that there was no trademark rights in ‘shredded wheat,’ despite the
fact that consumers recognized that there was a single source of the
product.”).
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“pillow” shape as National Biscuit (the functionality issue),243
and using the name “shredded wheat” to do so (the ostensible
trademark incapacity issue).244 The blend of the two concepts in
the Court’s regrettably unclear opinion245 has understandably
led some courts and commentators to think the same concerns
animate both functionality analysis and application of the
trademark incapacity bar. But Kellogg actually turns on
whether the term “shredded wheat” had become or was
currently operating as a generic designation, rather than its
etymology as a generic term.246 Understanding semantic shift
helps us understand how trademark incapacity and
functionality turn on distinct issues.
In Kellogg, National Biscuit sought to bar Kellogg’s sale of
pillow-shaped breakfast cereal biscuits on the ground that both
the shape of the biscuits and the name “shredded wheat” were
distinctive source signifiers that identied the product as coming
from National Biscuit.247 National Biscuit’s predecessor in
interest held a patent in the pillow-shaped biscuits and the
machinery to make them.248 The patents expired in 1912,
thrusting the production method into the public domain.249 If
the shape of the biscuits were treated as a protected source
signifier, Kellogg could be barred from offering the biscuits for
sale. The Court denied National Biscuit’s claim to trademark
protection in the pillow shape.250 Because the biscuit patents
had expired, the Court concluded that Kellogg had a right to
copy the shape and the method for making the biscuits.251
The Court in Kellogg also held that National Biscuit
possessed no exclusive right to use “shredded wheat” as a
243
244
245

246

247
248

249

250
251

Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119-22.
Id. at 117-19, 121.
See Dinwoodie, Story of Kellogg, supra note 235, at 238-39; 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 40, § 12:47.
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:47 (“Although its opaque opinion is far
from clear, the U.S. Supreme Court in [Kellogg] apparently held that all
that plaintiff had proven was a minority usage or de facto secondary
meaning in the generic name ‘shredded wheat.’”).
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 115.
Id. at 119-20 (“[O]n the expiration of a patent . . . there passes to the
public the right to make the machine in the form in which it was
constructed during the patent.”) (citing Singer Manufacturing Co. v. June
Manufacturing Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896)); Dinwoodie, Story of
Kellogg, supra note 235, at 239.
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 114 (“[The district court] held that upon the
expiration of the [patent], the name of the patented article passed into the
public domain.”); see also Dinwoodie, Story of Kellogg, supra note 235, at
225.
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 119-20.
Id. at 119.
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source signifier. While that part of the holding is cited as an
early example of the trademark incapacity doctrine,252 the
ruling instead turns primarily on the Court’s perception that
National Biscuit never established “shredded wheat” was
primarily a source signifier. The Court instead categorized
National Biscuit’s evidence of source significance as
insufficient.253 The Court never opined on what should happen
if National Biscuit’s evidence established that “shredded
wheat” was primarily a source signifier.254
Kellogg is thus a peculiar starting place for the doctrine of
trademark incapacity. The central feature of the doctrine is to
deny protection to terms that were once generic, even in the
face of probative evidence of primary source significance.
Indeed, the Court noted that the patents on the process for
creating the pillow shaped biscuits “repeatedly used” the word
“‘shredded’ . . . as descriptive of the product.”255 In light of this
use, the term “shredded wheat” was “essentially necessary” to
describe the product.256 The Court also noted that Kellogg’s
right to make the article included “the right to use the term by
which the public knows it.”257 The present tense of “knows”
here is telling. As the Court articulates, “shredded wheat” was
a generic designation for the product in question when the case
was decided.258 National Biscuit failed to show a change in

252
253

254

255
256
257

258

See supra note 242.
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 113 (“[T]o establish a trade name in the term
‘shredded wheat’ the plaintiff must show more than a subordinate
meaning which applies to it. It must show that the primary significance of
the term in the minds of the consuming public is not the product but the
producer. This it has not done.”).
In National Biscuit Co. v. Kellogg Co., 91 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1937), the
Third Circuit enjoined Kellogg’s use of the pillow shape and the term
“shredded wheat.” The court concluded that the process for making the
pillow-shaped biscuits entailed no shredding, and thus the term “shredded
wheat” was suggestive and capable of bearing source significance. Id. at
152-53. The court also seemed troubled that Kellogg had frequently
changed the name of its pillow-shaped biscuit cereal. The court viewed
these name changes as a deliberate attempt to deceive the public and free
ride on National Biscuit’s goodwill. Id. at 153-55. The court was also
persuaded that National Biscuit had successfully developed source
significance in the term “shredded wheat,” id. at 153, and that the
resulting “property right . . . should be respected,” id. at 154.
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 117.
Id. at 118.
Id. at 117; see also id. at 118 (explaining that use of the name “shredded
wheat” “was essentially necessary to vest the public with the full
enjoyment of that which had become theirs by the disappearance of the
monopoly”).
In addition, the Court concluded that Kellogg clearly met that obligation,
making “every reasonable effort to distinguish its product” from National
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consumer
perception.259
Kellogg
has
simply
been
misunderstood by many courts as a trademark incapacity
case.260
Even if one is inclined to engage in a broad reading of the
genericness analysis in Kellogg, the question remains: Why did
the Court bother to discuss National Biscuit’s failure to prove
secondary meaning? If the Court meant that no generic term
could acquire distinctiveness, why bother assessing the
evidence of secondary meaning at all? As others have
recognized, the opinion in Kellogg is a bit muddled,261 and
while some read the Court to clearly establish a trademark
incapacity bar, it did not do so cleanly.262
Restrictive change happens all the time, while a shift in the
necessity of offering a particular product or product feature
most likely does not. Functionality assumes that the core
aspects of products do not change over time.263 When a product
or process has been patented, the public and competitors get
the promise of eventual open competition after the patentee’s
window of protection closes. This quid pro quo is built into the
offer of patent rights to inventors. When the patent expires, the
product, or the process of making it, becomes part of the public
domain. Any competitor can then produce and sell the product,
driving prices toward the marginal cost of production (what it
costs to make the product) as multiple sellers begin offering
competing products. This competition saves consumers money.
When consumer demand changes, producers offer updated
products to meet that demand. Product features in the public
domain do not change, although their popularity might vary
over time.264 The flagging popularity of a feature or process

259
260

261
262

263

264

Biscuit’s product. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 116; see also infra notes 291-307
and accompanying text (describing the limits of unfair competition
protection in trademark incapacity cases).
Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118-19.
Cf. McKenna & Strandberg, supra note 234, at 29 (citing Kellogg as an
example of “longstanding Supreme Court precedent holding that there is a
right to copy unpatented product features”).
See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
I appreciate helpful feedback from Margaret Chon, Justin Hughes, and
Mark McKenna on this issue.
Cf. Joseph Miller, Error Costs & Functionality Exclusions, Presentation at
Works in Progress in Intellectual Property 2014, Santa Clara University
School of Law (Feb. 8, 2014) (arguing that the presumption that
trademark protection is weaker than other regimes may hold true for
word marks, but not for product design).
For example, while most consumers experience music through their
phones or computers, there is a limited but growing demand for vinyl
records and record players. Ed Christman, Record Store Day: Just How
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does not change its status within the public domain, although
the lack of popularity may well discourage copying. The critical
point is that the stasis that drives the functionality analysis for
product features is suboptimal for analyzing competition
concerns vis-à-vis the protection of word marks, because stasis
is not a characteristic of living languages.265
Finally, at its heart, the functionality doctrine is a tool for
maintaining lines between intellectual property regimes. As
the Supreme Court stated in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co., Inc.,266 the goal of the functionality doctrine is to prevent
trademark law from trenching on the role of patent law and
“inhibiting legitimate competition by allowing a producer to
control a useful product feature.”267 Unlike the functionality
doctrine, which polices boundaries between patent law and
trademark law, trademark incapacity deals with the question
of whether a generic term can be treated as though it has
added source significance, a question internal to trademark
law.268
To summarize, in light of the tendency of language to
undergo restrictive semantic shift, there is reason to doubt the
error-cost justification for trademark incapacity. Likewise,
rationales grounded in competition policy are too quick to
dismiss language change and consumer perception and fail to
vindicate applying trademark incapacity in its current form.
The next section proposes applying a primary significance
standard to determine whether generic terms can acquire
trademark protection.
B.

The Primary Significance Test Best Measures
Semantic Shift

It is time to retire the trademark incapacity doctrine and its
per se bar against protecting formerly generic terms. Instead,
the law should apply a primary significance test. If there is
evidence that the majority of consumers have come to see the
term as source-signifying rather than merely product-

265

266
267
268

Big Is the Resurgence?, BILLBOARD, Apr.18, 2013 (reporting an upsurge in
vinyl sales from 990,000 in 2007 to 4.5 million in 2012).
Cf. Bone, Enforcement Costs, supra note 70, at 2157 (“[T]here is a special
problem with protecting trade dress that does not apply to word marks.
Enjoining other firms from using a design feature can impede competition
in the product market when the design feature serves an important
function for the product itself.”).
514 U.S. 159 (1995).
Id. at 164.
My thanks to Becky Eisenberg for this insight.
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designating, the term should be protectable like any other
trademark.
As discussed above, courts faced with a genericness
challenge to a protected mark apply a primary significance test
to determine if the mark retains distinctiveness.269 As one court
recognized, “[t]he critical issue in genericness cases is whether
members of the relevant public primarily use or understand
the term sought to be protected to refer to the genus of goods or
services in question.”270 When considering whether a
trademark has suffered generislide, “majority usage
controls.”271 If the majority of consumers see a particular term
as a trademark rather than a product category, generislide has
not occurred.
The traditional “Teflon” and “Thermos” surveys applied in
generislide disputes investigate how consumers perceive and
use the challenged mark.272 For example, in Ty, Inc. v.
Softbelly’s, Inc.,273 a survey conducted by the plaintiff’s expert
found that 60 percent of respondents identified BEANIES as a
brand name for soft plush toys filled with beads. While that
could also indicate that as many as 40 percent of respondents
saw the term as a generic identifier, the court concluded that
the 60 percent response rate was evidence that the primary
significance of the mark was to designate the source of the
plaintiff’s goods.274

269
270

271

272

273
274

See supra notes 201-207 and accompanying text.
H. Marvin Ginn Corp. v. Int’l Ass’n of Fire Chiefs, Inc., 782 F.2d 987, 98990 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie Corner, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1251 (D.
Haw. 2003); see also Palladino, supra note 92, at 877 (noting that the
genericness inquiry focuses on whether the primary significance of a
challenged mark is to identify goods from a particular source, as opposed
to the product itself).
E.T. Browne Drug Co. v. Cococare Prods, Inc., 538 F.3d 185, 193 (3d. Cir.
2008). Teflon and Thermos surveys differ in how they engage in the
inquiry. Thermos surveys employ a series of open-ended questions, while
Teflon surveys use closed-ended questions. See E. Deborah Jay,
Genericness Surveys in Trademark Disputes: Evolution of Species, 99
TRADEMARK REP. 1118, 1122 (2009). A Teflon survey explains the
difference between product designations and trademarks to participants,
and then asks participants to categorize terms like “washing machine” or
“Chevrolet” as a generic designation or a trademark. If a majority of
respondents categorize the mark as a generic designation, courts take that
as evidence of generislide. A Thermos survey instead asks a respondent
how she would ask for a product in a store. If the majority of consumers
give the brand name, for example, “Thermos,” rather than “vacuum
bottle,” the survey indicates that the mark has become generic. See E.T.
Browne Drug, 538 F.3d at 195.
353 F.3d 528 (7th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 530-31. While the court in Ty referred to the plaintiff’s survey
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The same standard could be applied in acquired
distinctiveness cases. Courts would inquire how consumers use
the formerly generic term, and litigants could present survey
evidence on the issue. Assuming the study is otherwise valid, if
a majority of respondents identify the term as a trademark,
then the study provides important evidence that the term has
acquired secondary meaning and thus qualifies for trademark
protection. Courts could also use information designed to
anticipate consumer requirements, like search engine results,
to track current usage.275
The primary significance standard would also preserve a
distinction in how frequently descriptive and generic terms can
acquire trademark protection. The primary significance
standard is a more exacting standard than the showing of
secondary meaning required to secure protection in a
descriptive mark. A primary significance standard would
require that more than 50 percent of consumers perceive the
mark as source signifying. That level of consumer recognition is
sufficient, but not necessary, to establish that a descriptive
mark has acquired secondary meaning.276 Many courts instead
conclude that a showing in the 30 percent range is probative
evidence that a descriptive term has acquired secondary
meaning.277 Some might argue that primary significance sets
too low a threshold for a generic term to acquire
distinctiveness, but it is a higher bar than the law currently
requires for protecting other categories of marks.

275

276

277

evidence as probative, the defendant also failed to present its own survey
evidence of genericness.
See Lisa Larrimore Oullette, The Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102
CAL. L. REV. 351, 354 (2014) (arguing that Google search engine results
could “help adjudicate whether a mark has fallen into genericide”).
Spraying Systems Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 394 (7th Cir. 1992);
see also Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 381 (7th
Cir. 1976) (finding that responses to a likelihood of confusion survey
indicated that over 50 percent of respondents identified plaintiff’s
products with defendant’s mark, and concluding that “an extremely
significant portion of the population associates [plaintiff’s] products with a
single anonymous source”).
Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277, 295 (7th Cir. 1998)
(finding survey results in the 30 percent range probative of secondary
meaning); Zatarains, Inc. v. Oak Grove Smokehouse, Inc., 698 F.2d 786,
795 (5th Cir. 1983) (28 percent); Shuffle Master Inc. v. Yehia Awada, No.
2:05–CV–01112–RCJ–(RJJ), 2006 WL 2547091, at *3 (D. Nev. 2006) (35
percent); McNeil-PPC v. Granutec, Inc., 919 F. Supp. 198, 203 (E.D.N.C.
1995) (38 percent). Other courts have held that survey results in the 30
percent range are insufficient. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. Actavis
Group, No. 06 Civ. 8209(DLC), 2008 WL 228061, at *2 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(finding a 32 percent response rate insufficient to establish plaintiff’s color
mark is source signifying as a matter of law).
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In addition, applying the primary significance standard in
the trademark acquisition context would not require a change
to federal trademark law.278 The Lanham Act already includes
language which embraces the concept of semantic shift. For
example, a registered trademark can be cancelled if it “becomes
the generic name for the goods or services . . . for which it is
registered . . . .”279 Textually, the Act requires cancellation if a
mark becomes generic, but not if a mark is currently sourcesignifying, even if it was generic at one point.280 The Act also
specifies grounds on which the Trademark Office may reject an
application, including a determination that the mark “is merely
descriptive” of the goods or services of the applicant.281 The
statute does not grant refusal based on whether the mark was
ever descriptive, but instead merely inquires whether the mark
is descriptive at the time of application. While the statute does
not compel this Article’s preferred prescriptive approach, it
provides no obstacle to it.
Some commentators have advocated instead for a
replacement rule.282 Under a replacement rule, a generic term
could only acquire trademark protection if the old meaning has
been completely lost.283 At least one court reads Singer as a
case where the trademark resurrection occurred precisely
because the Singer mark “had wholly lost in then contemporary
public usage its generic meaning.”284 In other words, SINGER

278

279
280

281
282

283

284

See also 3 CALLMANN, supra note 9, § 20:33 (describing in detail how “[t]he
Lanham Act does not appear to compel the retention of the trademark
incapacity doctrine”); Levy, supra note 88, at 1211.
15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (L.A. § 14) (emphasis added).
Congress prescribed the primary significance standard for determining
whether generislide has occurred. See supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
15 U.S.C. § 1052(e)(1) (L.A. § 2).
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 15, ill. 1 (1995)
(proposing that a term that has a preexisting generic meaning cannot
acquire trademark rights unless the preexisting generic meaning has
become obsolete).
See, e.g., Ex Parte Pocket Books, Inc., 91 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 182, 185-86
(Chief Examiner 1951) (refusing registration for Pocket Book for pocketsized books and noting that “[i]t would appear that before the word could
be considered a trade mark, it must become practically obsolete as a
generic name for the article and must be recognized by the public as a
trade mark rather than as a generic term of the English language” and
that the “distinctiveness as a trade mark should not be recognized without
complete overwhelming proof”).
Miller Brewing Co. v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5, 7 n.2 (1st Cir.
1981) (proposing that the court in Singer awarded trademark protection to
a previously generic mark specifically because the term had fallen out of
common linguistic use and reacquired a primary source-signifying
meaning).
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was protected as a trademark because no one used the word as
a generic designator for sewing machines.
But a replacement standard would fail to protect
trademarks where there is clear evidence that a semantic shift
has occurred and that the trademark meaning is the dominant,
though not the exclusive meaning. Thus, the replacement rule
would not go far enough in reforming trademark law. For
example, a replacement rule would leave marks like KISSES
without trademark protection, because nearly 17 percent of
survey respondents identified KISSES as a generic term, even
though 80 percent perceived KISSES as source-signifying.285
Others might conclude that the common law of unfair
competition, embodied in Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,286
sufficiently protects the secondary meaning acquired in a
generic mark, even though courts refuse to recognize evidence
of secondary meaning and thus deny protection to those marks.
Courts have applied unfair competition remedies to prevent
“passing off” and to create some distance between senior and
junior users of generic terms when the senior user has acquired
de facto secondary meaning. For example, in Genesee Brewing
Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co.,287 the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit noted that a junior user is obligated to use “every
reasonable precaution to prevent confusion or the practice of
deception in the sale of its product,”288 even when using a
generic product designation.289 The rationale is that the senior
user’s claim to a mark is weak, and thus the senior user is
entitled only to “relief that will eliminate public confusion
over . . . sponsorship.”290
There are two problems with relying on unfair competition
remedies against passing off. First, cases like Genesee Brewing

285
286
287

288

289

290

See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
Genesee Brewing Co. v. Stroh Brewing Co., 124 F.3d 137 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding HONEY BROWN generic as applied to ales and affirming denial
of plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction).
Id. at 151 (quoting Kellogg Co. v. Nat’l Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 122
(1938)).
Genesee Brewing Co., 124 F.3d at 150; see also Gaylord Entm’t Co. v.
Gilmore Entm’t Grp., 187 F. Supp. 2d 926, 951 (M.D. Tenn. 2001) (stating
that a trier-of-fact could determine that the defendant engaged in unfair
competition in its activities related to the adoption, promotion, and
solicitation sales of the disputed mark, even if the term “Opry” were
generic, so long as the unfair competition claim was not predicated solely
on the defendant’s use of the term “Opry”).
Home Builders Ass’n of Greater St. Louis v. L&L Exhibition Mgmt., Inc.,
226 F.3d 944, 950 (8th Cir. 2000).
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may be the exception, rather than the rule.291 Many cases
refuse to extend unfair competition protection to a generic
term, even in light of evidence of actual consumer confusion.
For example, in BellSouth Corp. v. White Directory Publishers,
Inc., the court discounted evidence of consumer confusion on
the ground that a mark, once dedicated to the public, could
never be pulled back into trademark protection, and denied any
relief.292 Cases like BellSouth call into question whether unfair
competition law can do the work of recognizing semantic shift
when it has occurred.
Second, even when courts provide unfair competition relief
to senior users, courts frequently rely on disclaimers requiring
the junior user to disavow connection with the senior user as
the only relief.293 For example, in Barton v. Rex-Oil Co.,294
plaintiff was not entitled to protection of its registered
trademark, DYANSHINE for shoe polish because the court
concluded the mark was “merely descriptive” of the product.295
The court nevertheless concluded that consumers were
confused by the similarity of the names and directed the
district court to order defendants to add an affirmative,
prominent disclaimer stating that its DYE AND SHINE polish
was not produced by the plaintiff.296
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See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 40, § 12:48 (opining that courts err
when suggesting that they can create exclusive rights in generic terms
under the law of unfair competition, and that the user of a generic term
can obtain relief for passing off only if the newcomer engages in false and
confusing usage “above and beyond mere use of the generic name”).
42 F. Supp. 2d 598, 612 (M.D.N.C. 1999) (“Where the record so
conclusively establishes that a term was placed in the public domain as a
generic symbol by its creator and has been so used for over thirty years by
all in the industry, including the proponents of the mark and its
predecessors, survey evidence such as that presented by BellSouth cannot
serve even to create a genuine issue as to the status of the mark.”).
See, e.g., Blinded Veterans Ass’n v. Blinded American Veterans Found.,
872 F.2d 1035, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (speculating that on remand, the
district court could order the defendant “to attach a prominent disclaimer
to its name to notify the public that defendant’s organization was not
associated with plaintiff’s”); Warner Bros. Pictures v. Majestic Pictures
Corp., 70 F.2d 310, 312-13 (2d Cir. 1934) (requiring defendant to include a
disclaimer on advertisements for its film “Gold Diggers of Paris,” stating
that defendant’s film was not based on an earlier play or film with the
same title).
2 F.2d 402, 406-07 (3d Cir. 1924).
Id. at 404. Under the Federal Trade-Mark Act then in force, neither
generic nor descriptive terms could be registered. Common law protection
against unfair competition could still be obtained in a descriptive term.
See id. (citing Warner & Co. v. Lilly & Co., 265 U.S. 526 (1924)).
Id. at 407.

168

THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY

Vol. 17

Disclaimers, like the one ordered in Barton, are most likely
ineffective. Rebecca Tushnet notes that prominent disclaimers
might work when research respondents encounter “tombstone
ads”—print-only ads that are highly informational—but they
rarely work in the context in which they are encountered.297
Other research suggests that disclaimers actually have a
reverse effect: consumers presented with disclaimers are in
many cases more likely to associate the product sold with the
source disclaimed.298
The failure of disclaimers to clear up confusion has been
observed in other contexts as well. One FDA study indicates
that in some cases, survey respondents were more confident
that food provided health effects when the statement of the
health effect was qualified or somewhat disclaimed than when
the health claim was unqualified.299 Text-only disclaimers were
ineffective at helping survey respondents recognize different
levels of scientific support for certain health claims.300 In
addition, disclaimers did not change the positive view of the
health claim when consumers held an existing, erroneous belief
in the claim.301
A handful of cases suggest that a court could provide a
stronger remedy for passing off than merely ordering a
disclaimer. For instance, in Murphy Door Bed Co., Inc. v.
Interior Sleep Systems, Inc.,302 the plaintiff sought to prevent
the use of its registered MURPHY BED mark by the defendant
297
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Tushnet, Sixty Milliseconds, supra note 226, at 532 (citing Jacob Jacoby &
Robert Lloyd Raskopf, Disclaimers in Trademark Infringement Litigation:
More Trouble than They Are Worth?, 76 TRADEMARK REP. 35, 36, 54-58
(1986)); see also Gita Venkataramani Johar & Carolyn J. Simmons, The
Use of Concurrent Disclosures to Correct Invalid Inferences, 26 J.
CONSUMER RES. 307, 320 (2000); Mitchell E. Radin, Disclaimers as a
Remedy for Trademark Infringement: Inadequacies and Alternatives, 76
TRADEMARK REP. 59, 61-67 (1986).
Jacob Jacoby & George J. Szybillo, Why Disclaimers Fail, 84 TRADEMARK
REP. 224 (1994).
Brenda M. Derby & Alan S. Levy, Effects of Strength of Science
Disclaimers on the Communication Impacts of Health Claims, (U.S. Food
& Drug Admin., Working Paper No. 1, 2005), available at http://www.fda
.gov/OHRMS/dockets/dockets/03N0496/03N-0496-rpt0001.pdf (last viewed
Nov. 7, 2014).
Id.
Id. The value of the FDA study in describing behavior of disclaimers more
generally may be mitigated by a strong tendency of consumers to believe
in specious health effects. See Ben Goldacre, The Medicalisation of
Everyday Life, THE GUARDIAN, Sept. 1, 2008 (arguing that consumers
“invite [magical claims about health benefits] because we want to live in a
simple universe of rules with justice, easy answers, and predictable
consequences”).
874 F.2d 95 (2d Cir. 1989).
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to sell a competing product. Although the court concluded that
“Murphy bed” was generic for a bed that could be concealed in a
wall closet, and the registration was thus invalid, it affirmed
an injunction against the defendant. Murphy Door Bed is of
limited use as unfair competition precedent supporting the
grant of injunctive relief, however, because the defendant had
agreed in a licensing deal not to use the Murphy name if the
contract were ever terminated,303 and the court was not clear
whether it was affirming the injunction on unfair competition
or breach of contract grounds.304
In other cases, courts have restricted subsequent confusing
use of a generic term without enjoining the use per se. For
example, in King-Seeley Thermos Co. v. Aladdin Indus., Inc.,305
the court concluded that while King-Seeley’s THERMOS mark
for vacuum bottles had fallen into generic usage in the minds of
most consumers, some segment of the market still recognized
THERMOS as a mark for King-Seeley’s goods.306 Thus, the
court ordered injunctive relief requiring Aladdin to precede any
use of the word “thermos” with its house mark, to confine its
use of “thermos” to the lower-case “t,” and to never use the
words “original” or “genuine” in describing its product.307
If courts followed Murphy Door Bed in granting injunctions
against the confusing use of “generic” marks that acquire
secondary meaning, remedies against passing off would be
sufficient to validate consumer perception. Even the
replacement rule would be preferable over the status quo,
which leaves the public and the mark owner at the mercy of
ineffective disclaimers and the occasional judicial outlier.
Nonetheless, the primary significance standard will better
protect consumers from confusion and reduce consumer search
costs by focusing the judicial inquiry on the acquired source
significance of the term in question, rather than its generic
etymology.
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Id. at 102.
Compare id. at 102 (“Although the injunction was issued to prevent
trademark infringement, it was proper because defendants had contracted
to refrain from use of the Murphy name in the event of a termination of
the distribution agreement and did not so refrain.”), with id. at 104
(“[Defendants] committed breaches of their contract with Murphy and
engaged in unfair competition. We therefore affirm the district court’s
entry of a permanent injunction . . . .”).
321 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir. 1963).
Id. at 579 (“[T]here is an appreciable, though minority, segment of the
consumer public which knows and recognizes plaintiff’s trademarks.”).
Id. at 581.
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CONCLUSION
Semantic shift—the addition of meaning to the public
lexicon—is driven simultaneously by a need to communicate
and a need to resolve confusing ambiguity. Investing a word or
phrase with source significance such that it becomes a
trademark is a type of semantic shift. Like any other entry into
the creative lexicon, trademarks are created to fill a
communicative need. But the doctrine of trademark incapacity
incongruously disregards restriction, a common form of
semantic shift. Ignoring restriction may exacerbate consumer
confusion and increase consumer search costs.
Understanding that the formation of trademark meaning is
a form of semantic shift reminds us that sound competition
policy cannot neglect the importance of consumer
comprehension. Instead, trademark law must take into account
consumer perception and properly weight consumer confusion.
The doctrine of trademark incapacity does neither. The law
should instead adopt a primary significance test for
determining whether a mark that was once generic has
acquired sufficient distinctiveness to merit trademark
protection. Trademark law would then better match its
accepted search-cost rationale, and trademark acquisition
would better reflect the semantic shift of which it is a part.
This Article focuses on what the semantic shift literature
can teach us about trademark incapacity. There is more work
to be done in determining whether trademark law currently
strikes the right balance between incumbents and new
entrants and between interested groups of consumers. But an
understanding of semantic shift provides crucial insight into
how trademark owners as “speakers” initiate and maintain
semantic shifts that create new trademark meaning, and how
the public as “listeners” accept, reject, and reshape those
attempts at source-signifying innovation. Incorporating
theoretical and cognitive research on language change may
help us better evaluate the key descriptive and normative
claims for the current trademark regime at each phase in the
lifecycle of a trademark. Thus, recognizing how language
changes can spur effective legal reform that better reflects the
consumer protection and competition concerns at the heart of
the trademark system.

